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AIM, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
01. AIM AND SCOPE : 
The Middle East occupies a very significant place 
in international relations. This region forms the bridge 
between Europe, Asia and Africa. The three great religious 
namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam have sprung from 
this very soil. It is also strategically the most important 
geographical area in the world for it provides trade routes 
to peoples of different lands. It is integrally related to 
some of the world's most strategic water ways, especially 
the Dardonelles and Suez canal. 
In the modem times two new factors have 
accentuated the importance of the area : air communica-
tions and oil. The swift airways and the discovery of 
gigantic oil reserves in the Middle Eastern lands in the 
beginning of the present century led to a new struggle 
among the industrial states of the West for the control of 
these resources. 
India has vital interests in the region, its 
economy and society at large is effected by oil prices and 
also because a very large number of Indians are working 
there. Their remittances form a very crucial part of the 
foreign exchange reserves of the nation. 
Recognising this importance, a number of 
specialised Centres of West Asian Studies/Middle Eastern 
Iv 
studies are working in the country/ Aligarh Muslim 
University has one of them. I therefore choose this topic 
because of its topicality. 
It was given the task of preparing an annotated 
bibliography of 206 articles on "ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONS 
SINCE 1990" as it was thought that it might be of great use 
to research scholars in this field. 
Part one deals with introduction of the topic. Part 
two which is the main part of the present study consists of 
an annotated bilbiography of 206 articles on the topic. 
Part three however deals with indexes. 
0.2 BIETHODOLOGY : 
The material was collected from different journals 
from the seminar library of Department of Political 
Science, Centre for Strategic Studies, Centre for West 
Asian Studies and Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U. Aligarh. 
021. STANDARD FOLLOffED : 
The Indian standard recanmendations for bibliogra-
phical references (IS:2381-1963), Indian standard 
recommended for abbreviation for titles of periodicals (15: 
18-1949) and classified catalogue code (CCC) of Dr. S.R. 
Ranganathan have been followed. In certain cases where the 
said standards became unuseful. I have preferred my own 
judgement. 
022. SUBJECT HEADING : 
Attempts has been made to give co-existenslve 
subject headings as much possible. An efforts has been made 
to allow postulates and principles given by SR Ranganathan 
in the formation of subject. And allowed by natural 
language if more than one entry comes under the same 
subject headings. There are arranged alphabetically by the 
authors name. 
023. ARRANGEMENT : 
The entries in this bibliography are arranged 
strictly alphabetically among the subject heading. 
The ENTRY ELEMENT of the author(s) is in capitals, 
followed by the secondary element in parenthesis using 
capital and small letters and then the title of the 
article, subtitle (if any), then name of the periodical in 
abbreviated form (if needed) being underlined followed by 
the volume number, issue number, the year, giving by using 
inclusive notation of the pages of the articles. Then each 
entry is followed by an indicative abstract of the article. 
The items of the bibliographical reference for each 
entry of a periodical article are arranged as follows : 
(a) Serial number 
(b) Name of the author/authors 
(c) A full stop (.) 
(d) Title of article including subtitle and alternative 
title if any. 
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(e) A full stop (.) 
(f) Title of the periodical being underlined. 
(g) A full stop (.) 
(h) Volume number 
(i ) A comma (/) 
(j) Issue number 
(k) Semi colon (;) 
(1) Year 
(m) A comma (/) 
(n) Month 
(o) Semi colon (;) 
(p) Inclusive pages of the articles. 
(q) A full stop (.) 
023. SAMPLE ENTRY : 
6. SCHULZE (Kristen E). Coercive diplomacy : The 1950 
Israeli attack on a Lebanese airlines. Middle Eastern 
Studies. 31/ 4; 1995, October; 919-29. 
0231. EXAPLANATION : 
This article is taken from the periodical "Middle 
Eastern Studies" which is entitled as "Coercive diplomacy : 
The 1950 Israeli attack on a Labanese airlines" written by 
"Kristen E. Schulze", in 4th number of 31st volume of the 
October, 1995 year, on the pages from 919 to 929, against 
this entry. 
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024. ABSTRACT : 
Tne entries in the bibliography contain abstracts 
giving the essential information about the articles 
docijmented, I have given indicative abstracts as well as 
informative abstracts. After searching the literature, 
entries were recorded on 7" x 5" cards. 
025. INDEXES 
The part three of the bibliography contain author, 
and the title indexes in alphabetical sequence. Each index 
is guides to the specific entry or entries in the 
bibliography. 
A list of periodicals has been given with their 
place of publication and frequency. 
* PART ONE * 
* I N T R O D U C T I O N * 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The Arab-Israeli Relations Since 1990 : 
The Arab-Israeli conflict is a result of respective 
claims of two peoples Palestinians and the Jews to the same 
land in Palestine. After the first World War Britain became 
a Mandatory power in this area. Under the auspices of this 
Mandatory powers the Jews started migrating to Palestine 
from Europe. This led to Arab resentment and the 
Palestinian resentment which resulted in many intermittent 
clashes which grew over the years. 
The Jews who were spread all over the world were 
quite keen that they should have homeland of their own. 
They wanted to migrate from all parts of the world and 
settle down in Palestine. Britain, France, and the USA were 
all favourably inclined to meet this demand and give a 
national homeland to the Jews. This was being done inspite 
of fact that the Arabs will not be happy over the 
arrangement and secondly that this will result in 
Arab-Israel conflict. 
Demand for Homeland : 
The Jews knew that all allied powers were 
favourably inclined to accept their demand and create a 
homeland for them. In order to strengthen their demand and 
make a favourable situation for themselves, the Jews 
started migrating from different part of the world to 
Palestine/ where they wished to have their homeland. Not 
only this, but they also purchase cultivable land from the 
Arabs. Another important step which they took was that they 
began to set up industries in which they employed Jews 
only. They invited Jews from other parts of the world to 
work in these industries so that they could have more 
industrial base in Palestine then the Arabs. Not only this, 
but they felt that by providing employment to Jews that 
they could raise their living standard. In this way both by 
settlement of industries, purchase of land, the Jews 
strengthened their claim over Palestine. 
This policy of Jews was no way less irritating for 
the Arabs. They were not at all prepared to accept this 
situation by which their land should go to the hands of the 
Jews and that their population in Palestine was under the 
mandate of Britain which became under heavy strains. The 
British government was in a fix and infact had found out no 
formula by which they could satisfy both the Arabs as well 
as Jews, because claims of both the parties were quite 
conflicting and contradictory. This mandate came under such 
heavy strains that Peel commission recommended that 
British mandate over Palestine should be immediately 
terminated. It was also suggested that Palestine should be 
partitioned. In the first instance the government accepted 
recommendation of commission about partition of Palestine. 
But when several details were worked out, non appeared to 
be satisfactory either to the Arabs or Jews and in 
frustration partition proposal as a way out to solve the 
problem dropped down. As a result of British policy to 
please the Jews, the Arabs also broke in open revolt in 
1938. By the time Ilnd World War broke out, the Arabs were 
quite disillusioned. With the Britisher, the Jews were 
rather close to the Britishers and had an upper hand in 
Palestine where they had migrated in large numbers and set 
up several industries. 
During second World War both the warring nations 
tried to havle maximum control over Middle East. But Hitler 
followed the deliberate policy of finishing Jews. It was 
also a time when even the allied powers wanted co-operation 
of the Arab and as such they did not wish to displease them 
by raising Jewish issue. But inspite of all this Jews-
Arabs relation in any way did not improve. Not only this, 
but there were several time several riots in which both the 
jews and the Arabs adversely suffered. 
Position After Second World War : 
As the war came to an end Arab-Jew issue became 
alive algain. In 1945 when new elections where held in 
Britain, war time Prime Minister Churchil's party did not 
came to power. England returned Labour party to power and 
Mr. Bevin became new foreign secretary. During war time 
many Jews became displaced and over spread all over the 
world. They pressed every world power that they should be 
given to some permanent homeland. In this way demand and 
problem which had gone in the background war time, came out 
as an urgent problem calling for an immediate solution. 
Mean while Israelies followed a policy of genocide of the 
Arabs. 
Jews continued to follow aggressive policy both 
towards the Arabs and Britishers. Arabs land were forcibly 
confiscated and they did not bother to know vrtiether the 
Arabs held any legal titles to any property or not. The 
situation became so tense and out of control that the 
British government openly declared that the mandate had 
failed and that Palestine problems should referred to the 
UNO. The world body accordingly appointed a special 
commission to examine Palestinian problem. The commission 
came to conclusion that the mandate was unworkable and also 
that only solution to the problem was that Palestine should 
be partitioned. British government however did not agree 
with these recommendation and in 1948 decided to withdrew 
from Palestine. 
Birth of State : 
As the Britisher withdrew from the scene Arab-Jews 
conflict again surfaced with greater vigour. Arabs got 
material/ moral menetary support from league of Arab states 
in their struggle against the Jews in Palestine. The 
struggle continued and ultimately on May 14/ 1948, the Jews 
declare independence of Israel and immediately the U.S. 
Government gave recognition to the newly born state. A few 
month later in March 1949, UN General Assembly also 
admitted the new state as its member. 
Relation between Arabs and Israels : 
Right from the very beginning the relations between 
the Arabs and Israel are in strain. 
First Arab Israel War (in 1948) 
First Arab Israel War (in 1948) also effect the 
relation between Arabs and Israel. As soon as the state of 
Israel was proclaimed, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, attack Israel. 
It was war between six lacs Jews and four crore Arabs, but 
the Arabs were defeated and loss of the portioned 
Palestinian state. This also resulted the massive influx of 
Palestinian refugees in the neighbouring states. Israel 
after the war joined in area double of its size. The Arab-
Jewish conflict resulted in the emergence of the state of 
Israel and demonstrated the weakness of the Arab. It also 
demonstrated the weakness of the Arab league which had been 
formed in 1945, and had amongs its members. The Jews 
received more help from outside than Arab. 
Suez Crisis (Second Arab-Israel War, 1956) 
During the Suez crisis the Arab-Israel relations 
were not cordial. The Arab states were not able to put up 
with very existance of Israel. Israel attacked Egypt in 
1956 and the United States and France stood behind her. 
That led to the Suez crisis of 1956. On account of the 
attitude of the Soviet Union, both French and British 
troops withdrew from December 1956. Israel refused to 
withdrew from the Gaza strip and Sharmul Sheikh. She 
demanded the presence of the Uniteld Nations Emergency 
Force at Gaza and opening of Aqaba Gulf and Tiran Strait. 
Though Aqaba was opened to Israel, the Suez remained closed 
to her. Ultimately, israel withdrew in March 1957. 
There was quiet for about two years but tension 
begain to grow. When Egypt seized vessels in the Suez canal 
carrying Cargo for Israel. In 1959, Egypt stop the passage 
of Israeli goods for East Asia. Egypt justified the 
blocking of Aqaba in 1959 on the ground that belligency 
conditioned still continued. This lead to great tension 
between Arabs and Israel. 
Third Arab-Israel War (1967) or June War 
The Hostalities between the Arabs and Israel 
continued throughout the sixties. Naseer in 15 May, 1967, 
reuqested the Secretary General of the United Nations to 
withdrawl of the UN emergency force from the Gaza strip, 
Sinai Desert and Sharmesh Sheikh, which was barrier between 
the United Arab Republic and Israel, the UN Secretary 
General agreed and withdrew the force. President Naseer 
imposed a total blockade on Israeli in the straits of Tiran 
and Gulf of Aqabi. It was claimed that the water of Tiran 
strait belonged to the United Arab Republic. The situation 
began to worsen and there wals imminent danger of war. The 
result of this war was that the Israel occupied the entire 
Sinai Peninsula including Sharm-el-Shaikh port advanced the 
Suez Canal and captured Gaza strip. She got control of the 
old city of Jerusalem with the result that the whole 
Jerusalem came under her control. She overran the whole of 
Jordan, West of Jordan river, involving the capture of 
Bethlehem Hebran. Israel also captured the some important 
part of the Syria. 
The walr of July 1967 caused disappointment and 
self examination among the Arabs. Even after the ending of 
hostilities there was no peace, clashes between Arabs and 
Israeli forces continued. There was also a grealt 
diplomatic activity to maintain peace in the Middle East. 
Many peace plans were put forward by but finally these 
plans were failed to made the cordial relations between 
Arabs and Israel. 
Fourth Arab-Israel War (1973) (The Tom Kippur War) 
The major cause of the Arab-israel war of 1973 was 
the exaspiration of the Arabs at the intransient Israeli 
attitude. On 6 October 1973, when the Jews were busy 
observing one of their rituals connected with Yom Kippur, 
Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. The conflict is often 
referred to as the Yom Kippur war. The Arabs crossed the 
Suez canal and overwhelmed number of Israeli position in 
Sinai desert, other Arabs countries also declared was 
against Israel. On 7 October 1973, the Israeli had to fight 
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on two fronts against the Syrian in the Golan heights and 
against Egypt in the Sinai Desert. On the third day of the 
walr Golan heights were captured. On the tenth day, the 
Suez canal was crosseld and West Bank was captured by 
Israel. Israel closed all supply lines to one lakh Egyptian 
fighting on the West Bank. Actually, it was only on 27 
October, 1973 the Arab and Israel gun became silent after 
the return of the United Nations Force. The war ended in 
draw. The cease fire was brought into effect before Israel 
could recover from the initial reverses. Israel felt 
defeated because this time she could not be victorious. By 
the October war the Arabs were able not only wipe out the 
shame and humiliation of the defeat of 1967 but were able 
to explore the myth of Israel's invincibility. The self 
image of Israel was considerably destroyed. A side effect 
of the war of 19 93 was the realisation of the importance of 
the oil weapon. Arab found that they had in their oil a 
bargaining power in international relations. On 5 November, 
1973, the OPEC decideld to lay oil embargo against Israel 
and her supporters Iran also backed the oil embargo. 
Israel Relations with Lebanon : 
Lebanon became a major concern for Israeli foreign 
policy following the civil war in 1975. The outcome of this 
war led to the curtailment of Christian power, the 
permanent military presence of Syria, and a territorial 
base for the PLO which it utilized to launch attacks on 
Galilee. Labor governments tried to contain this situation 
by enhancing the power of Major Saad Haddad in southern 
lebanon, and by conducting retaliatory actions against PLO 
strongholds inside Lebanon. Likud continued this policy, 
but enlarged the scope of the strikes; in 1978 it conducted 
a major "mopping up" action known as the Litani Operation. 
These strikes eventually brought about a de facto truce 
between the PLO and Israel, which was negotiated by the 
American envoy Philip Habib in 1981. 
In June 1982, following an attempt by non-PLO 
Palestinians to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in 
London and a subsequent two-day artillery exchange between 
the IDF and the PLO, israel invaded Lebanon. The major 
force behind this decision was Defense Minister Ariel 
Sharon, who overcame the initial resistance of the 
government. There were two major assumptions underlying the 
Israeli move. First, that the political power of the PLO 
and its influence on the West Bank could be eradicated if 
its territorial bases in Lebanon were destroyed. As a 
result, the Palestinians were expected to be more receptive 
to the de facto annexation of the West Bank. Second, that 
Israel's active intervention would help the Meronite 
Phalangists preserve hegemony over the more numerous 
Lebanese Muslim population. Such a Phalagnist government, 
dependent on Israel for its continued existence, was 
expected to sign a peace treaty with Israel. 
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The outcane of the war fell short of most of these 
expectations. Only the departure of the PLO, which was 
encircled in Beirut/ and the subsequent disintegration of 
the organization were perceived as a success. The turmoil 
following the assassination of Lebanese President elect 
Bashir Gemayel in September 1982 demonstrated that ensuing 
massacre in the refugee camps in Beirut provoked an 
international outcry that led to the removal of Sharon from 
his Defense Ministry post. The May 1983 peace agreement, 
which was negotiated between Lebanon and Israel under U.S. 
mediation, was never implemented primarily due to Syrian 
objections. The accord wals subsequently abrogated. 
Relations with Other Middle Eastern States : 
Both Labor and Likud have over the years made 
contact with a number of moderate Arab states, most notably 
Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Most of the contracts with 
Jordan involved disputes over water sharing in the Jordan 
River system. Morocco was influential in negotiating the 
initial stages of Sadat's peace initiative. Following the 
peace agreement with Egypt, there was a brief tendency in 
the Israeli government to seek a Tel Aviv-Cairo Riyadh 
axis. According to persistent but unconfirmed reports, the 
main architect of this policy was Ezler Weitzroann, then 
Defense Minister in the Likud cabinet. He was overruled by 
Begin and Sharon. 
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historical rivalry over Palestine. In the pre-1948 period, 
the leaders of the Jewish Yeshuv in Palestine had limited 
contacts with the local Palestinian elite, which were 
disrupted by competing national aspirations and periodic 
civil strife. After the foundation of the state, these 
limited relations were severed. After the 1967 war, \^ich 
established Israeli rule over more than one million 
Palestinians, the contacts with the local elite, especially 
the mayors and notables, were re-established. However, both 
the Labor and Likud governments have strenuously opposed 
any links with PLO. Since most Palestinians living under 
Israeli rule came to support the PLO, and many leaders and 
notables were dismissed from office or deported by 
occupation authorities, the renewal of contacts after 1967 
did not lead to any fruitful political dialogue. 
Nonetheless, the anti-PLO policy is almost unanimously 
accepted by the Israeli public; only a small number of 
left-wing politicians have supported negotiations with the 
PLO. 
Outside the region, Israel has a special relation-
ship with the world Jewish community. Unlike other 
immigrant states, Israel has formally acknowledged this 
special tie. The Law of Return gives any Jew the right to 
settle in Israel. The state of Israel has routinely relied 
on the Jewish community for financial and political help. 
Despite some disagreements. Diaspora Jewry has largely 
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acknowledged Israel's dominant position at the Jewish 
state. 
Peace Initiative : 
Fresh attempts were started to de-escalate the 
tension as well as efforts were being made to bring the 
conflicting parties to the negotiating table. In this 
connection Efforts towards ppeace. Camp David Agreement. 
The US Secretary of state. Dr. Henry Kissinger did much to 
maintain a peace making momentum by tours of Arab countries 
(called Shuttle diplomacy) to secure negotiations for a 
permanent settlement. Israel agreed to withdraw its troops 
in Sinai to a line approximately 20 miles from the Suez 
canal and Egypt to reduce its forces on the east bank. 
Israel and Syria agreed to withdraw their troops of the 
1967 cease-fire line, and ruined town of Quneitra, capital 
of the Golan Heights was handed back to Syria. 
A permanent peace plan became possible when 
President Sadat of Egypt visited Jerusalem in November 
1977. Begin and President Sadat has signed two documents 
which together provide a framework for peace in the Middle 
East. One of these dealt with the bilateral problems 
between Egypt and Israel, which the two leaders undertook 
to restore by concluding a peace treaty providing for an 
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the establishment of 
normal relations between the two countries. The other major 
issue was the future of the West Bank and Gaza strip and 
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provided for the election of a Palestinian self-governing 
authority to replace the existing Israeli military 
government/ once the authority is being made, there should 
be a transitional period of not more than five years, 
during which the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza 
would exercise autonomy; and finally as soon as possible 
not later than third year after the beginning of the 
transitional period, there should be negotiations to 
determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and to 
conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. 
In the Arab World, hoever, the agreement were 
regarded as proof that President Sadat had abandoned the 
Palestinians and his Arab allies in order to satisfy 
Egyptian interests. The government of Saudi Arabia 
contributed the unusually outspoken comment that the Camp 
David agreements constituted an unacceptable formula for a 
definite peace. The resignation of egyptian foreign 
minister showed that not even Egyptian opinion was whole 
heartedly in favour of the Camp David formula. The 
advocates of the Camp David argued that if the Palestinians 
cooperated in the arrangements for a transitional period of 
self-rule, the result of this process would be sooner or 
later an independent Palestinian states, and if 
Palestinians refused to cooperate, they would provide 
Israel with an excuse to perpetuate its occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza. In 1981 President Sadat was 
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assassinated by Muslim extremists at a military parade in 
Cairo. Sadat's popularity declined as a result of his 
por-western stance in foreign policy-
After three UN Secretary council resolutions a 
Cease-fire became precariously effective on 25th October 
1973. According to UN secretary council resolution 338 of 
22nd October 19 73, the Security Council called upon all 
parties to cease all firing, implement security council 
resolution 242 (1967) and start negotiations. Post 1990 
Peace Prospects : 
The defeat of Iraq by the multinational force in 
February 1991 renewed the goodwill of the USA. At the 
beginning of March 1991 President Bush stated that a 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was one of the 
principal alms of US foreign policy in the post-war period. 
In April 1991 the US Secretary of state James Baker visited 
Israel, Egypt and Syria in order to promote the idea of a 
regional peace conference. Syria, Egypt and the PLO 
rejected the proposed regional conference, favored an 
international conference supported by the UN and with the 
full participation of the PLO. The US secretary of State 
described the settlement of the immigrants in the occupied 
territories as the biggest obstacle to the coming of a 
Middle East peace conference. 
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In July 19 91/ President Assad of Syria agreed to 
participate in direct negotiations with Israel at a 
regional conference/ based on UN Secretary Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. It increased the intense 
diplomatic pressure on Israel to do likewise. President 
Bush and Gorbachev/ the USA and USSR in July 19 91 announced 
their intentions to act as a Joint Chairman of a Middle 
East Peace conference which they had scheduled to take 
place in October 1991. Later the, Israeli cabinet formally 
agreed to attend a peace conference on the terms proposed 
by the USA and USSR. 
What is occurring today with respect to the 
recognition of and the deal with Israel/ has its origins in 
the Camp David accord signed in 1979 between Egypt and 
Israel. Then the entire Arab World, including the PLO/ had 
opposeld it tooth and nail and termed it as a conspiracy. 
The disappearance of one Super Power (USSR), making the 
other all powerful/ is said to be one of the major factors 
leading to the dramatic change in the attitude of the Arab 
world towards illegal and illegitimate Israel. 
The Parties had come to the negotiation table for 
the first time in Madrid in October 1991 at joint 
initiative of the USA and USSR. The purpose of 
Christopher's visit to Syria/ Jordan/ Lebanon and Israel 
would be to convey to all the parties the American 
commitment to advance the peace negotiations and to tell 
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their views on how best to promote progress. It made clear 
that the US had no intention to impose a solution but the 
leaders of the region can make peace successful. 
Palestinian Accord of 1993 : 
In June 19 92 Rabin wins the election as the Israeli 
Prime Minister and he promiseld that within a year he will 
reach on autonomy accord with the Palestinians. On 
September 10, 1993 Arafat and Rabin simultaneously announce 
the mutual recognition of Israel and PLO paving the way for 
further agreements. Finally on September 13, 1993, the Gaza 
Jericho autonomy accord was signed in Washington in the 
presence of the PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, the Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Robin and the US President Bill 
Clinton. 
The main points of the Accord 19 93 are as follows : 
This accord envisages granting autonomy to the 
Palestinian residing in the Gaza strip and the West Bank 
town of Jericho. The time schedule of the implementation is 
as follows : 
(i) Agreement on Israeli military withdrawal from the 
Gaza strip and Jericho within two months. 
(ii) Complete withdrawal of military from Gaza and 
Jericho within four months of the agreement on 
withdrawal is signed. 
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(iii) Direct elections for a representative Palestinian 
council within nine months. Israeli military forces 
will withdraw outside populated areas prior to 
elections. 
(iv) The transition period will not exceed five years 
during which the negotiations for the final status 
of the occupied territories West Bank and Gaza will 
take place. The negotiations will commence as soon 
as possible but not later the beginning of the 
third year of the interim E)eriod. 
(v) T In Palestinians will exercise authority over 
education, culture, health, social welfare, direct 
taxation and tourism. 
(vi) To guarantee public over and internal security for 
the Palestinian of the West Bank at Gaza strip, the 
council will establish a strong police force, while 
Israel will continue to carry the responsibility 
for defending against external threats as well as 
the responsibilities for over all security of 
Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their 
internal security and public order. 
(vii) Disputes regarding the interpretation or 
application of the agreement to be resolved through 
negotiation by the Joint Liaison committee. 
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Conclusion : 
From the establishment of the Israel till today, the 
Arab-Israel relations arle day by day deteriorated. The 
Arabs continued their wars against the Israel but every 
time when they invaded Israel they were given a good 
rebuff. The Arab nations even as a combined force could not 
get the aggression vacated. After 19 48/ many Arabs believed 
that the establishment of Israel had been an act of 
scandalous injustice that could be rectified only by the 
Jewish state's elimination. They argued that Israel's 
demise was possible because it constituted an aberrational 
state that had not build on genuine nationalism, since the 
Jews are only a religious group. However in the face of 
Israeli achievements and vitality, represented by Israel's 
military facts and especially its resounding victory in 
1967, the belief that Israel would disappear could not be 
sustained. Thus Arabs leaders came slowly to the conclusion 
that they had to resign themselves to Israel's existence, 
if only as a policy of "cutting losses", for only then 
could the Arab countries hope to retrieve the territories 
they had lost in the 1967 war, and the Palestinian gain a 
state of their own in their territories occupied in this 
war. 
For the Palestinians, accepting Israel's existance 
meant relinquishing the hope of in gathering the diaspora 
population, since a smaller Palestinian state, truncateld 
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by the partition, would not sufficient to absorb such a 
population. While such a plan has been only theoretical/ 
for Palestinian faced with the difficult circumstances of 
the diaspora it was comforting to entertain such a hope. 
Many Palestinian understand that once there is a political 
settlement, Israel can not be forced to accept a mass 
influx of Palestinians without jeopardizing its being a 
Jewish state. At most, diaspora Palestinian originating 
from the territory Israel proper can demand compensation 
for property, but they can not hope to reclaim it. 
There are numbers of issues which effect the 
relationship between the Arabs and Israel. These issues can 
be solved through the negotiation between both the Arabs 
and Israels. Thesle issue are boundries. Border tensions 
and security, the refugees, development of water resources, 
and arms race and cold war. 
Finding a situation in which vacation of aggression, 
with armed conflict was impossibility, Egypt unilaterally 
decided to negotiate peace with Israel and vacation of 
Egyptian territories under Israel occupation. Egyptian 
president even went to Jewish capital for negotiations. 
This was strongly resented and disapproved by other Arabs 
state, which served even diplomatic relations with that 
country. Israel on its part however, welcomed the move and 
in good gesture handed over occupied territories to Egypt. 
But still a large part remains under Israel's occupation 
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and control and Arab-Israel relations remain as strained 
and bad as these once were. Creation of homeland for the 
Jews has solved no problem. 
In 1949, Israel was admitted to UNO and Jews got 
their homeland. It was however, never thought that with 
this peace will be restored in the Middle East. Almost 
every nation was more than sure that the conflict was bound 
to continue. Lakh of Arabs had leave to Palestine due to 
repression of the Jews and they went to Egypt, Gaza strip 
and many other places. 
In 1956, for the first time, the Arab Israel conflict 
broke out when with the support of England and France, 
Israel invaded Egypt. It was at time when question of 
nationalization of Suez canal was still before UNO. Israel 
had the advantage of aggression and the invader could 
capture large Egyptian territories. But this situation is 
unacceptable both to USA and UNO. Both of them jointly 
intervened from the occupied territories of Saina and Gaza. 
Thus Israel could not reap much fruit of aggression. 
Jews were, however, not satisfied with what had 
happened. They were in search of an opportunity, when they 
could again occupy Egyptians territory. This opportunity 
again came in 1967, when Israel found weak Egypt. Israel 
suddenly attacked Egypt and in remarkable way occupied Suez 
canal, Saini and Gaza and many other Egyptian territories. 
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The Arabs continued their war against Jews but every 
time when they invaded Israel, they were given a good 
rebuff. The Arab nations even a combined forces could not 
get the aggression vacated. The invaders continued to 
occupy Egyptian soil firmly. 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict dealt a body blow to 
the Arab pride. The ruthlessly efficient Israeli war 
machine had overwhelmed them in seven days. Israel occupied 
Sinai, Gaza strip. West bank and Golan Heights. It now had 
the real state necessary to deal with the Arab from the 
positions of strength. The year 1967 offered perhaps one of 
the most strategic movement as well as an ideal 
opportunity. The Arab f aught one of the most self-
destructive mistuned war, with Israel, losing land and 
lives. The UN security council passed the historic 
resolution 242 which emphasised the inadmisibility of the 
acquisitin of territory by the war and need to work for a 
lasting. The peace in which every state can live in 
security. It called for among other thing, the Israel 
withdrawl from the occupies territory of Golan Height, West 
Bank and Gaza strip. 
Peace Process : 
The whole world is an interested party in West Asia, 
because as long as the Arab-Israel conflict continues it 
may at any time produce a clash between the United states 
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and other interested party, and this might lead to an 
atomic third world war. So in the best interest of peace 
and mankind, the problem of Arab-Israel confntration has to 
be peacefully resolved. The peace process in West Asia 
might be the best methods or instrument for improvement the 
relations between the Arab and Israel. 
Therefore, if the Syria, the most important actor of 
the region, is brought into the scene by resolving its 
dispute with Israel especially on the Goldan Heights issue. 
After several round of negotiation and meditory role play 
by the US, Israel has agreed to withdraw from Golan 
Heights. However, the difference remain still over the time 
frame and modalities of withdrawl. This is because there is 
breathtaking military dimension in controlling the Golan 
Heights. There was a way of hope in July 1994 when US 
secretary of state Waren Christopher conveyed to Syria his 
understanding, that Israel now understood that there would 
be no regional peace with Syria without withdraw from Golan 
Heights, while Syrian president insists on immediate and 
complete withdrawl from Golan heights. 
Sadat tried to change the asymmetry in 1973 but 
dkespite the initial gains, ultimately had to accept a 
humiliating defeat. He realized that in the face of 
continued American military and political support to the 
Israel, a military solution to the Arab-Israel imbroglio 
wals not feasible. He agreed to negotiate, but the Camp 
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David accord which was signed in 1978 by Egypt and Israel 
for the peace process, which split the Arab community, the 
PLO stepped up its compaign, however the Israeli 
retribution was quick and harsh. It wals force to move out 
of Lebanon. 
Arafat soon came under considerable pressure from 
within his own organisation. There were additional 
difficulties as well. The Soviet union was no longer to 
support his cause. He had sided with Saddam Hussain in the 
Gulf and his finances viz. Saudi Arabia and UAE had checked 
his financial pipeline. At the same time, thousands of 
Palestinian workers were forced to move out of Saudi Arabia 
and UAE. Time is running out for Arafat and the writing on 
the wall was clear like Saddat, he too needed to seek a 
political settlement with Israel. The ongoing "Madrid peace 
process" offered little hope as the talks were stymied 
right from the beginning. Both side fearing adverse public 
opinion at home were unwillingly to offer any meaningful 
concessions. Another channel, away from the gaze of 
international media had to be found for a heart to heart 
dialogue. 
The negotiation were stalemated on many occasions. 
The Arabs wanted greater territorial concessions. The 
Israel would not compromise on the security of their 
settlement. Ultimately the trust and confidence generated 
in free and frank discussions held in an informal 
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atmosphere paved the ways for mutual give and take and led 
to the conclusion of two agreement viz. the "Declaration of 
principles for Interim Self government" and "Mutual 
Recognition". The Declaration provide for limited autonomy 
to the Palestinian in the Gaza strip and Jericho in the 
West Bank. Israel withdrawl from these areas was to begin 
in Decembelr 1993 and completed before the end of 1994. 
Negotiations for the permanent status of the occupied 
territories are to begin before December 1995 and completed 
before 1998. Status of Jerusalem is also stateld for 
discussion in the future. 
Thus the ideal solution to the Arab-Israel relation 
after the war should be not just a renewal of previous 
truce, but a permanent peace settlement between Israeli and 
Arab states. To be permanent, this peace settlement must 
not be imposed by force. It must be one that is accepted by 
both belligrents, not juston a paper, but imbalmed in their 
hearts. Only a peace settlement that is recognised by both 
sides to have be genuinely accepted can open the ways for 
reconciliation and co-operation between th«n. With this 
prerequisite an era of good relations between the Arabs and 
Israeli may dawn without delay. 
******** 
* PART TWO * 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY * 
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ARAB-ISRAEL RELATION, after GULF WAR 1991,role of USA 
1. INDYK (Martin). Watershed in the Middle East. Foreign 
Affair. 71, 1; 1992; 70-93. 
With the end of the Cold War and its Gulf Victory 
in 1991, the Bush administration was in an ideal position 
to restructure the Middle East order. However, this survey 
of the year's making events in the middle East show that 
the US chose to stabilize the old order rather than remake 
the Middle East in its own preferred image. The Middle 
East peace conference in Madrid was nonetheless the year's 
crowing achievement for president Bush and the result of 
several important developments : the disintegration of the 
USSR and its shift from competition to co-operation with 
the US; consequent Syrian weakness; Saudi Arabias willing-
ness to support US diplomatic efforts; Plaestinian 
miscalculations; Israeli flexibility; and the primacy of 
American influence. The fact that the Arabs and Israelis 
were finally talking to each other would not alone solve 
the region's problems. 
, SIX DAY WAR, 1967 
2. MANN (^eodore R). Palestine State ? Journal of South 
Asian and Middle East Studies. 14, 1; 1990, Fall; 43-50. 
After twenty years of more or less constant 
warefare, Israelis in 1967 believed that they finally had 
what it would take to produce peace - territory, lots of 
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it. Surely they thought, now they would finally get a 
peace treaty. Surely they theorized/ no one would expect 
them to withdraw from any of the territory except in 
exchange for peace. 
, AGREEMENT OSLO, ANALYSIS 
3. MICHELS (Jeffrey). National vision and the negotiation of 
narratives. The Oslo agreement. Journal of Palestine 
Studies. 24, 1; 1994, Autuman; 28-38. 
Behind Edward Said's criticism of the Israeli-
Palestinian declaration of principles is the assumption 
that since the agreement fails to reconcile the 
conflicting narration of the two peoples, it serves the 
stronger Israeli side and weakens Palestinian nationalism. 
But national vision, the unifying force that combines 
naratives and links narrators under the banner of 
nationalism, is threatened from within, by its own 
narratives to a much greater degree than it can be 
threatened by narratives that do not claim to serve it. A 
"literary" analysis of conflicting Israeli and Palestinian 
narratives suggests that the authority of leaders to tall 
"the story of the people" is difficult to maintain in 
diplomatic agreement. The DrP in fact, can only succeed by 
not resolving the conflict. 
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II, PEACE SETTLEMENT 
4. USHER (Graham). Politics of internal security : The PA's 
new intelligence services. Journal of Palestine Studies. 
25, 2; 1996, Winter; 21-34. 
With the signing at Taba of the Israeli-Palestinian 
interim agreement "Oslo II", it has became clear that 
future realization of a peace settlement between Israel 
and Palestinians no longer wings on international 
legality. Increasingly, it rests on a definition of peace 
that translates as uncondtiional security for the Israelis 
and conditional security for the Palestinians. The 
overarching concept of Israel's security is operative in 
the new agreement, deciding not just the pace of the 
expanding self rule, but, vlery likely, its eventual 
geopolitical shape. It is also a definition in which the 
Palestinians current political leadership in effect the 
Palestinian Authority rather than the Palestine liberation 
orglanisation has acquiesced, whether tactically or 
strategi cally. 
, PALESTINE RULE,and OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
5. HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH. Times of India. 156,', 208; 1993, 
Sep, I; 10r 
While there is no room for euphoria because of the 
attendent threats, the agreement between the Israelis and 
the Palestinians for Palestinian self-rule in the occupied 
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territories is a truly historic breakthrough in the bitter 
and protracted conflict in West Asia. Once It is formally 
signed in Washington, perhaps as early as this week, it 
will mark the beginning of the end of twenty-six year of 
Israeli military rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
This, in turn, could pave the way for a durable settlement 
of a dispute which has brought untold suffering to Jews 
and Arabs alike even as it caused nightmares in the 
chancellories and military establishment of the major 
powers for close to five decades. The successful 
implementation of the agreement could indeed be a prelude 
to realising the national aspirations of the Palestinians 
and to facilitating Israel's withdrawl from the Golan 
Heights while ensuring the secure existence of the Jewish 
state. 
, AGGRESSION > ISRAELI, 19 50 
6. SCHULZE (Kristen E). Coercive diplomacy : The 1950 Israeli 
attack on a Lebanese airlines. Middle Eastern Studies. 
31, 4; 1995, October; 919-29. 
On 24 July 1950 an Israeli fighter plane attacked 
a lebanese passanger plane during its flight from 
Jerusalem to Beirut. This act of aggression was heavily 
criticized by Israel's Arab neighbours who regarded it as 
just another hostile act in the continuing Arab-Israeli 
conflict. It set a precedent not only for Arab-Israeli 
relations in general, but for Israeli-relation with 
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lebanon in particular. The proclamation of the state of 
Israel in May 1948 and the consequent declaration of war 
by the surrounding Arab states did not change the 
situation between Lebanon and Israel significantly. Even 
through Lebanon was officially fighting against Israel, in 
actual terms Lebanese involvement was minimal. 
, and ARMS CONTROL POLICY/ISRAEL 
7. STEINBERG (Gerald M). Israeli arms control policy : 
Caution realism. Journal of strategic Studies. 17, 2; 
1994, June; 1-16. 
As a result of the peace process, Israel has 
become an active participant in the multinational working 
group on arms control and regional security and arms 
control policy units have been created in the ministries 
of Defense and foreign affairs. Israeli arms control 
policy is based on four stages. (1) Implementation of a 
wide network of confidence and security building measures. 
(2) Major conventional arms limitations, including the 
Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. (3) 
Implementation of the chemical weapons convention by all 
states, including Egypt and the development of a regional 
framework for verification and inspection; and, finally, 
after all threats to national survival have ended, (4) 
Regional restraints on strategic systems, including 
balistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Israel will 
continue to reject the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
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due to the potential threats from Iran and political 
instability in Egypt, Algeria etc. and reflecting the 
inadequacies in the WPT regime and verification system. 
, ARAB-ISRAELI SECURITY/ COMMUNITY 
8.KARSH (Efraira) and SAYIGH (Yezid). Co-operative approach to 
Arab-Israeli security. Survival. 36, 1; 1994, Spring; 
114-25. 
This article, therefore, proposes the formation of 
an Arab-Israeli 'security' community; the main function of 
which would be to provide Israel and its immediate Arab 
neighbours with the means to manage military, political and 
strategic relations on a co-operative basis. In the 
article, author explain why a cooperative approach to 
Arab-Israeli security is needed and how it would work. How 
to provide security far all will make is easier to persuade 
the negotiating parties to mark a concessions and accept 
certain asymmetries as they will be assured that their 
primary concerns will be addressed. Indeed this elaboration 
of a comprehensive, multilateral deal embodied in the idea 
of an Arab-Israel security community-fills the vaid in the 
agendas for the ongoing multilateral and bilateral peace 
talks. Tradeoffs are the key to successful negotiations, 
but without a sense of the wider linkages and an assurance 
of mutuality and reciprocity compromise became possible. 
The Israel-Palestinian Declaration of principle has opened 
a withdraw of opportunity. If this opportunity is to be 
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exploited/ and the Arab-Israeli conflict resolved an 
Arab-Israel security community will have to be developed. 
, ARAB SUMMIT, CAIRO 
9. MENON (Kesava). Arabs warn Israel against backtracking. Che 
Hindu. 119,151; 1996, 25 June; 12. 
Israel and Arab world, main interlocutors in the 
West Asian negotiations, while reaffirming that peace had 
become the "Strategic Objective" for both of them, are 
seemingly engaged in an exercise to ensure that the blame 
will fall on the other if the negotiation get derailed. 
The whole process of accommodation between the Arab and 
Israel is poised at a delicate stage following the advent 
of the new, right wing Israeli government and both parties 
appear intent on protecting their flanks. At the conclusion 
of their summit in Cairo, Arab leaders issued a communique 
which was expected, moderate, in tone but which neverthe-
less contained a warning. Arabic countries which had make 
openings to Israel would be "forced to reconsidelr the 
steps taken towards Israel in the framework of the place 
process and the government of Israel alone would be a full 
responsibility. If there was any deviation from the 
principle of "Land for peace". 
, ARMS CONTROL, and REGIONAL SECURITY 
10. STEINBERG (Gerald M). Middle East arms control and regional 
security. Survival. 36, 1; 1994 Spring; 126-41. 
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After decades of Intense animosity and two years of 
negotiations/ important steps towards the amelioration of 
the Israeli Palestinian conflict were taken in September 
1993. Further agreements between Israel, the Palestinians 
and Jordan on the West Bank and Gaza Strip will include 
provisions for demilitarisation and limited force zones, as 
well as the verification and monitoring of these 
limitations. Additional arms control measures will not be 
required at this stage, although they will be important in 
the negotiating redeployment on the Galan Heights and 
developing stable security relationship in the Middle East. 
In this article, the policies of the major actors will be 
analysed and the basis for developing confidence building 
and arms-control measures in the Middle East will be 
explored in detail. A number of concrete steps are proposed 
that are consistent with the security requirements and 
shared interests of the parties in the region. 
, BOUNDARIES, STATE 
11. BRAWER (Moshe). Boundaries of Peace. Israel Affairs. 1, 1; 
1994 Autumn; 41-63. 
One of the most difficult problems that, the Arab 
Israeli peace process must face is the final delimitation 
of i.e. Israel's boundaries of with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan 
and the future Palestinian state. Undelr the Egyptian 
Israel peace treaty of 1979, the boundary was officially 
demarcrated and recognized. Debate is sure to arise on the 
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crucial issues of fertile agricultural land, strategic 
military sites, Israeli settlements and Arab villages, as 
well as above and below ground water resources. No less 
important than the determinations of the future boundaries 
are the agreements and arrangements on the actual functions 
of these peace boundaries. Much of the damage and 
resentment caused by the imposition of new boundary lines, 
or the restoration of outdated Anglo-Ottoman demarcations 
may be attenuated by making the resulting interim areas 
zones of contact and cooperation at both a national and a 
local level. 
, CONFLICT, INTEREST GROUPS, ISRAEL 
12. YISHAI (Yael). Three faces of associational politics : 
Interests groups in Israel. Political Studies. 40, 1; 199 2, 
March; 124-36. 
A study of interest groups in Israel reveals the 
three strands of interest groups theory. The organizational 
attributes of interests groups qualify Israel as 
corporatist, with a high degree of concentration, 
monopolization and cohesion. The Israeli scene may be 
characterized as pluralist when strategies are under 
concern. The pluralist aura of Israeli interest policies is 
dimmed, however by strong strands of partyism manifested in 
a law subjection associations to strict state supervision 
and in the group own norms. Some variation can be 
attributed to group category, with party affiliated groups 
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learning more towards political parties, economic 
organization tending to participate in semi-corporatist 
structures and promotional associations demonstrating 
pluralist characteristics. These variations now ever do not 
eradicate the basic attributes of interest politics in the 
country. 
, CONSERVATIVE VIEWPOINT 
BUTTERWORTH (Charles E). Political Economy of liberty in 
the Arab and Islamic middle East. Middle East Policy. 3, 2; 
1994; 104-24. 
After a preliminary definition of the conservative 
as one who associates the good with the old, even the 
ancestral, and conservatism as seeking first to understand 
what is good about actual practice and how it reflects an 
established understanding of the good, the paper seeks to 
apply this definition to contemporary politics in the 
Middle East - especially the Arab Israeli and Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. It looks critically at the way 
Israelis favoured in conservative circles and argues for a 
better graps of the difference separating conservatives and 
liberals and how it applies to this question. Disagreeing 
not over freedom and equality, but over how to achieve them 
and then how to protect them once achieved, conservatives 
are no more able than liberals to defend the USs unduly 
strong commitment to Israeli security or deafness to Arab 
plea for attention to their cause. 
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, DECOLONISATION, SOCIOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT 
14. SHAFIR (Gershon). Israeli decolonization and critical 
sociology. Journal of Palestine Studies. 25, 3; 1996 
Spring; 23-25. 
Decolonization is justified by the rationale that 
territorial separation of Israelis and Palestinians will 
provide security to the former and sovereignty to the 
later. While these two goals would certainly be enhanced 
by Israeli withdrawl. Israeli and Palestinian negotiations 
have already discovered juSt how difficult it would be to 
separate two groups living on such a small strip of land 
and sharing many of its resources, most importantly water 
and the environment. Some of the circumstances that argue 
against separation are East Jerusalem, where the two 
populations are roughly of equal size; the fact that the 
Gaza strip and Weslt Bank are physically split by Israeli 
itself and in need of a land bridge; and of course the 
desire of about one-sixth of Israel's citizens who are 
themselves Palestinian Arab force longer measure of 
integration into Israeli society. These situations require 
that Israelis and Palestinians learn to live together, in 
addition to living side by side. 
, ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
15. ALBUM (Andrew). Israel turns towards the East. Middle 
East. 252; 1996, January; 27-8. 
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In the aftermath of Israel inking peace deals with 
the PLO, and Jordan, the Middle East has begun to move 
towards greater economic cooperation. As businessmen begun 
to meet at conferences such as those held recently in 
Easablanea and Amman, some Arab politicians accused Israel 
of seeking to replace military domination with economic 
colonialism. South East Asia is the Area of greatest 
fascination for Israeli business at present and looks like 
remaining so for some time to come. 
, effect of GULWAR 
16. MORTIMER (Jasper). Backing the wrong horse. Middle 
East. 198; 1991, April; 16. 
PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat's alignment with Saddam 
Hussein during the Gulf war has succeeded in raising 
Israel's reputation in Europe. In the short term, at least, 
Arafat has not helped the Palestinian cause. 
17. PERETZ (Don). Impact of the Gulf war on Israel and 
Palestinian political attitudes. Journal of Palestine 
Studies. 21, 1; 1991 Autumn; 17-35. 
The Gulf War had a traumatic impact on its foreign 
and security policies. The War also raised hopes once again 
that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian would 
finally be settled. Israel quickly recovered from the 
economic effects of the war. The curfew that had been 
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imposed during the war on the West Bank Gaza, the longest 
in Israelis twenty four year occupation, had brought the 
Entire economy virtually to a halt. Economists calculated 
that the territories were working at only 25% capacity by 
the time the war ended and the curfew was lifted. The 
estimated cost of the curfew to the Palestinian community 
was between $ 150 million and $ 200 million. In the 
occupied territories, the war only added to the frustations 
of those disappointed by the course of the intifada and 
embittered by nearly quarter century of occupation. A 
survey was conducted in FEb. 91 on the impact of the Gulf 
war on Israeli attitudes towards democratic values and 
institutions, separation of powers, respect for the law, 
and tolerance of minorities. The status of 
Israeli-Palestinian relations after the Gulf war was well 
characterized by Meron Benven isti "that we all prepare 
ourselvels for a serious hangover after the war. The 
euphoria will end, a big headache will take over, and every 
one will feel depressed because there are no quick change". 
18. SAFTY (Adel). Arab-Israeli balance power after the storm. 
International Relations. 12, 3; 1994, December; 51-74. 
The Gulf was accentuated the process of decline in 
Arab power which begun after the 1973 was Iraw and Libya 
one under seige; Lebanon is partly occupied; Jordan is 
weak, the PLO is neutralized, Syria is virtually alone and 
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without allies, and Egypt is military weaker today than she 
was in 1973. Israel on the other hand, is military stronger 
than ever possessing a growing and sophisticated nuclear 
arsenal, enjoying international respectability, increased 
Economic and Political co-operation wi th Europe, and Even 
more privileged strategic co-operation with the U.S. Israel 
is also looking beyond and Arab periphery for markets and 
political influence, to at once by pass and contain 
potential Arab power. 
19. SZNAJDER(Mario). Impact of the Gulf crisis in Israel. 
Jewish Sournal of Society. 36, 2; 1994, Dec; 101-11. 
The Gulf crisis caused Israelis to confront a novel 
situation; the home front would now be the arena of war of 
the threatened Iraqi attacks on the country's cities took 
place. The system of civil defence was questioned and the 
pratective measures proposed did not find universal 
approbation. Instead of Israeli civilians relying on the 
Defence forces to defend them, as in the post war and 
crises, it was now individual citizens and families who had 
to ensure their own survival. International pressures 
precluded the usual offensive option and the usual closing 
of ranks of the civilian population in support of the 
Defence Forces did not take place under there new 
conditions of crisis. Social cleaverges emerged clearly. 
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ISRAEL 
20. ABADI (Jacob). Gulf war and its Implications for Israel. 
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. 11, 3; 
1994, Spring; 55-77. 
Although Israel was compensated by the US for the 
damages caused by the Iraqi scud missile attack, the 
increase covered only part of the loss incurred during the 
Gulf war. Significant as the economic difficulties are, 
the Gulf war will be measured more by its impact o n the 
Palestinians dilemma and the Arab Israel conflict. RAther 
than being a turning point, the war accelerated certain 
tendencies that had already existed both in Israel and in 
the Arab world. It is clear that the peace process not 
only did not come to an end but also intensified as a 
result of the war. A slight change in the Israeli attitude 
towards the Palestinians began to take place, however, 
only after Rabin's rise to power. 
21.LEVITT (Wendy Kristianasen). Squeezing out the Moderates. 
Middle East. 197; 1991, March; 15-6. 
Assailed by Iraqi missiles and maintaining, at least 
for a time, much-published restraint, Israel has 
immeasurably improved its image in the United States. It 
looks un likely man ever mat Washington will not pur 
pressure on Israel after the Gulf war to make substantial 
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concessions and the occupied Territories. The resulting 
rise in militancy will mean the end of the moderate 
Palestinian leadership/ something wh ich the hardline 
Israeli government sems to welcome. 
22. . * ' GOVERNMENT DISINTEGRATION 
HARRISON (Drew). Verge of upheaval. Middle East. 187; 
1990, May; 15-6. 
The disintegration of Israel's National Unity 
government has brought the country's entire political 
system. At the same time, any active participation in a 
peace dialogue with the Palestinians has been forestalled. 
22, / ^SIX DAY WAR, 1967. 
GERA<Gideon).Israel and the June 1967 War : 25 years later. 
Middle East Journal. 46, 2; 1992, Spring; 229-43. 
June 1967 war appear as a watershed in the history 
of Israel and of the Arab-Israel conflict, but subsequent 
events in the Middle East have not settled the conflict. 
Israel acquired vast territories, including palces of 
profound historical significance to its people, its 
self-assurance was boosted by a sense of having broken 
Arab encirclement, its population and Economy grew despite 
recurring crises, and its society developed, military 
capabilities improved and the country's international 
standing was Enhanced. On the other hand, Arab hostility 
was almost unreniting and both sides wasted potential 
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opportunities for reducing tenrions. Twenty five years 
after the June 1967 was, some aspects of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict have been obviously changed. 
, JEWISH-MARONITE RELATION 
f 
24. JAVED IQBAL.Israel's Policy towards minorities in the Arab 
World: A study of Jewish-moronite relations. JWAS. 7; 
1991; 53-63. 
The state of Israel war established in 1948. It 
became necessary for Israel, both before and after its 
creation to establish friendly relations with all those 
forces in the Arab world, which did not have a fundamental 
conflict with pau-Arabism; for the purpose of 
consideration of national security. These forces are non 
Muslim minorities in Arab world like. Christians in 
Lebanonm Kurch in Iraq, Druze in Syria and the Copts in 
Egypt and non Arab nations on the periphery of the Arab 
world like. Turkey and Iran and at another. Allience with 
minorities groups in the Arab world had a 
quasi-edeological dimension. The centre-piece of this 
entire strategy of an allience of minorities were the 
christians of Lebanon, Particularly the Maronites. A 
Moronite state in Lelanon would be a model and focal point 
for all christians in the Arab world. It would strengthen 
the justification for a Jewish state in the area even in 
the eyes of the Arabs. 
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, ,LIBERIA 
25.KIEH (George Klay). Analysis of Israeli representation of 
Liberia. Liberian Studies Journal. 14, 2; 1990; 117-29. 
The re-establishment of diplomatic, relation between 
Liberia, and Israel is an integral part of the latter's 
foreign Policy strategy of repenetrating the African 
continent. The re-establishment of relations with Israel 
has no served the national interests of Liberia. First, 
Liberia has lost a considerable amount of economic 
assistance from various Arab States. This aid has not 
been made fep for by minuscule Israeli technical 
assistance program. Second Israel continue to play a 
pivotal role in the violation of human rights of the 
liberian people in supplying the Doe regime with the 
technology of terror that it use to facilitate its 
tyrannical rule Israel has been unable to fulfill the 
many promises made to the Doeregim when the restoration 
of relations was negotiated. 
, EGYPT, FOREIGN POLICY 
26. KARAWAN (Ibrahim A). Sadat and the Egyptian. Israeli 
peace revised. International Journal of middle East 
studies. 26, 1-4; 1994; 249-61. 
One Arab country, namely Egypt, concluded a peace 
treaty' with Israel, almost a decade and a half ago led 
s<xne to re-examine that case to see what made it 
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possible. The available literature on Egypt's 
disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict has been 
valuminons/ as many policy makers and analysts in Egypt/ 
Israel/ the rest of the Arab world/ and the United 
State's published their accounts of this development. 
Despite many ideological and political differences among 
these writers they all concluded that this foreign policy 
shift represented a radical alteration of Arab Policies 
towards Israel and with Egypt out of the war equations 
the regional balance of power had changed dramatically. 
This article has three main objectives. The first is to 
examine Egypt's foreign-Policy shift, and not just the 
Jerusalam trip, in light of the literature on the primary 
of the role of leaders in foreign-policy, making in less 
developed countries. Second is to construct an 
explanation of this shift that biks it to aspects of 
Sadat's operational code and the nature of Egyptian Pal. 
system. Third is demonstrate the in consistencies and 
short comings in the explanation for Egypts foreign 
policy shift that focus on Adat's belief system. 
, EGYPT-ISRAEL PEACE TREATY, ASSESSMENT 
27. BARD{Mitchell G). How fares the Camp David trio? Orbis. 
34/ 2; 19 00,, Spring; 227-40. 
A peace treaty that preserve the peace would seem to 
be a success. But the Egypt-Israel peace treaty was 
expected to do more than prevent war. It was expected to 
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initiate a process that would lead to normaalizatlon of 
Egypt-Israeli relations and provide a foundation for a 
comprehensive peace between Israel and her neighbours. 
Neither has occured. Recent events suggest Egypt may be 
moving away from its treaty commitment's ultimately, what 
prevents Egypt from abrogating the treaty/ however, is 
its' dependence on American assistance. This relationship 
give the US leverage to encourage Egypt to pressure the 
other Arab States to recognize Israel. A wider peace, 
moreover, will require the US to persuade other Arab 
governments to take confidence building measures. 
, RELATIONS, ETHNICITY and INEQUALAITY, ISRAEL. 
28. HANDELMAN(Don). Contradictions between citizenship and 
nationality: Their Consquences for Ethnicity and 
inequality in Israel. International Journal of Politics, 
Culture and Society.7, 3; 1994, Spring; 441-59. 
Israel's declaration of independence in 19 48 
enjoined the holistic encompassment by the state of the 
Jewish people as its citizens but also called on the 
"Arab inhabitants" of the state to become full and equal 
citizens along with them. Due to the singular conditions 
revolving around the creation of the state of Israeli 
vast polemical arguments have arisen over the exact 
nature and meaning of the world citizen. Today a clear 
separation exists as a boundary between Israeli Arab and 
Jew, which acts to tear apart the egalitarian 
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universalistic premise of citizenship and continues to 
enforce the contradiction between citizenship and 
nationality. Furthermore, categories have been made 
regarding the country's Jewish eclat or community along 
ethnic, lines there by establishing relations of 
hierarchy and inequality amongst Jewish nationals. 
, GULF WAR and PALESTINE 
29. HASSAN( Shamir S). Palestine-Gulf linkage and theGulf 
crisis. Symposium on the Gulf crisis and Peace Prospects 
in West Asia. 1992, 22-23 January; 19-28. 
The Palestinian problem has always remained critical 
in virtually all the macroevents of West Asia in recent 
decades. The recent crisis in the Gulf is no exception. 
Saddam Hussein's misadventure in Kuwait has brought to 
the fare new realities in which one can review the 
question of Palestine in its present phase. This paper is 
an attempt to assess, the link between the Gulf as a 
focus of international competition and internal 
development on the onehand, and palestine as the focus of 
a perenial conflict, and of a faltering settlement 
process on the other hand. 
,, INTIFADA 
30. .INTIFADA UNDER PRESSURE. Middle East. 183; 19 90,January; 
80. 
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The Palestinians uprising in the occupied 
Territories still represents a genuine and widespread 
expression of nationalist feeling. But faced with Israeli 
intransigence and the failure of the PLO to deliver 
results from its peace initiative, it is becoming 
increasingly disorganised and brutal. 
31. WlNG(Adrien Kotherine). Intifada: The Emergence of 
Embryonic legal mechanism for Palestinian self 
determination. Arab Studies Quateraly. 15, 4; 1993, Fall; 
63-82. 
In Exploring the restructing of the legal system for 
the upcoming autonomy period, Palestinian decisionmakers 
should analyze the emergence of Embryonic legal mechanism 
during intipader. The nascent process in which vario us 
legal actors created new Executive, legislative, and 
judicial institutions as well as prcedures to implement 
new rules of decisions has relevance for independence as 
well. The extent to which rules are obyed by the 
Palestinians is a reflection of either legitimacy or 
coercion. The Embryonic system is put within its proper 
historic context of eight pressxisting legal layers. 
Several major obstacles stand in the way of a fuller 
development of Palestinian legal mechanisms during 
autonomy. 
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,and GULF CRISIS 
32. HEACOCK(Roger). From the mediterranean to the Gulf and 
back again: The Palestinian intifada and the Gulf War. 
Arab Studies Quaterly. 13, 162; 1991, Winter/Spring; 
65-77. 
Examines the interaction between the Palestinian intifada 
and the Gulf crisis, from mid 1990 to mid 1991. Argues 
that significant changes have taken and are taking place 
in the discourse of Palestinian activists and 
inrtellectuals, even as the intifada continues. Tries to 
show that Palestinian have historically been subject to 
the geographic and cultural pull of two distinct 
cultures, that of the mediterranean and that of the 
Gulf, which have successively had the upper hand as poles 
of attraction and influence; the nineteen - eighties 
represented the clear ascendancy of the Gulf model, which 
has now once again, atleast for the time being, been 
superseded by the drive to coordinate with the 
mediterranean nations of Asia, Africa and Europe. 
, , and PALESTINE PROBLEM 
33. ABU-LUGHOD(Ibrahim). State Formation, the Intifada and 
the Qestion of Palestine.Journal of South Asian and Middle 
Eastern Studies. 14, 1; 1990, Fall; 51-65. 
The two principles of a political solution have now 
become clear; first that the acceptance of the 
existential right of the two people to coexist on the 
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land of Palestine must be affirmed; second that a 
settlement must be negotiated between the two legitimate 
representatives of the people concerned. The fact that 
King Husayn has removed himslf as a claimant of any part 
of Palestine-King Husayn's vacting of claims was made 
imperative by the Intifada - should be helpful in 
projecting the clear role of the Palestine libration 
organisation as a negotiating party. In that sense, the 
Question of Palestine would be resolved; the Palestian 
people would thus be enable to resume the process of 
state formation and practice the independence of the 
state of Palestine which they declared in Algiers. 
/ ^ ^^ ^^° 
34. KHALAF (Salah). Lowering the Sword. Foreign Policy. 78; 
1990, Spring; 92-112. 
The Intifada sems irreversible peace i the Middle 
East is possible only if Israel agrees to the two-state 
solu tuion proposed by the leaders of the Palestinian 
liberation organisation, with a state of Palestine 
Established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East 
Jerusalam as its capital. Palestinians would thus finally 
benefit from their fundamental right to self 
determination. The US must reject the Shamir plan and 
respond more positively to those voices of reason that 
speak today of the two-state solution, such as Abba Eban, 
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Ezer Weizman and others. The US must also refrain from 
resticting Jewish immigration to their country, for in 
refusing new immigrants, then only encourage the Israeli 
government's colonist policy in the occupied Territories. 
In the interest of peace, Israeli officials must agree to 
negotiate with representative of the PLO, who are 
approved of by the large majority of Palestiniane, and w 
ho in the recent past have shown their full determination 
to reject terrorism and work towards peaceful 
cohabitation. 
, , and VIOLENCE 
35. HARRISON (Drew). Changing shape of violence. Middle 
East. 195; 1994, January; 20-1. 
Events in the Gulf have temporarily distracted 
international attention from the intifada and the 
Palestinian issue. The situation is becoming more and 
more violent, with a spate of random border attacks over 
the past few months and an increasingly nasty atmosphere 
with in Israel itself. 
, , effect of GULFWAR. 
36. MONSHIPOURI <Mehmood) and RIGSBEE II (Wallace L). 
Intifadah: Prospects and Obstacles in the Aftermath of 
the Gulf crisis. Journal of South Asian and Middle 
Eastern Studies. 15,2; 1991, Winter; 46-67. 
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The intifadah is the single most important 
expression of Palestian nationalism since the creation of 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation(PLO) in 1964. 
Through Intifadah/ the Palestinians have forced the 
Israelis, the Arab work/ the west and the exile PLO 
leadership to reorg. recognise their struggle for 
self-determination. It is also a domestic event for the 
people connected by birth with the land of former Mandate 
Palestine- It is also a youth movement which has 
dominated the local unviersities and organisation and in 
a sence reflects the disencantment of erlders by the 
young Palestinians. Thus Intifadah has an internal 
dimension that is just as significant as its 
international or external dimension. 
.MILITARY of ISRAEL 
37. iMBAR(Efraira). Israel's small war: The military response 
to the Intifada- Armed forces and Society. 18, 1; 1991/ 
Fall; 29-50. 
Analyses Israel's military response to the intifada. 
Beginning with a discussion of the attitude on the part 
of the main Israeli decision makers toward the use of 
force in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, it goes on to analyze 
the crystallization of Israeli Strategy to deal with the 
Palestinian uprising. It reviews the main stages in the 
developing Israeli response. The following section 
focuses on how the Israeli defence forces adapted to 
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waging a small war for which it was unprepared. The slow 
process is reviewed in terms of manpower policy, 
intellegence, training, operation and equijanent the 
article concludes with a discussion of the question 
whether violatory is possible and at what price. 
, , ^PUBLIC OPINION, POLITICS-ISRAEL 
38. ARINA(Asher) and SHAMIR(Michal). Public opinion and 
Political change: Israel and the intifada. Comparative 
Politics. 24, 3; 1992, April; 317-34. 
The relations between public opinion and politics 
are investigated by looking at changes in Israeli public 
opinion as a result of the intifada using panel data. The 
intifada has had a clear impact on the Israeli public. 
Three simultaneous processes seem to be operating, a 
generalised hardening of positions on short term issues 
regarding Arab-Israel relations, a steady and increasing 
moderation of opinions on creating long-term issues of 
security policy and a growing polarization of attitudes 
and political power between the more conciliatory left and 
the more hard-line right. Peoples attitudes have tended 
to change in the same direction in which they were already 
leaving. Changes in Public opinion are linked to 
developments in Israeli politics, government, policy and 
party alingments. 
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GEOGRAPHICAL - ANALYSIS 
39. NOBLE(Allen G) and EFRAT(Elisha). Geography of the 
intifada. Geographical Review. 80, 3; 1990, July; 288-307. 
The conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Israelis 
has steadily expanded since December 1987. This article 
provides a geographical interpretation of the widening. 
Demographic factors strongly favour the Arabs. Newly 
Established Jewish settlements in the occupied territories 
provoked the Arabs, and their refugee camps became the 
initial foci of conflict. The uprising then diffused along 
prinicipal routes of access in both the Gaza strip and 
Judea, Samaria. The unity carefully fostered by the 
Israelis since 1967 for Jerusalem proved to be Ephemeral. 
, in OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
40.ROUHANA (Nadim). Intifada and the Palestinian of Israel: 
Resurrecting the Green line. Journal of Palestine Studies, 
le, 3; 1990, Spring; 58-75. 
The forms and extent of the support of Palestinians 
in Israel for the uprising in the occupied territories and 
their political response to it are defined by the patterns 
of their involvement in the Israeli system. Israeli 
Palestinians face the problem of now to achieve equality 
in an ideologically exclusivist state. Despite this 
obstacle, many of the leaders of Arab-Israeli community 
believe that the peaceful establishment of a Palestine 
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State in the West Bak and Gaza would reduce inter-Ethnic 
tension in Israel. However the problem of Palestinian 
identify would still remain. 
, , role of HAMAS 
41. BARI (Zohurul). Hamas and the peace Efforts. Symposium on 
the Gulf crisis and Peace Prospects in West Asia. 1992, 
22-23 Jan; 15-8. 
Hamas which played considerable role in the intifada 
indicating its deep roots in the occupied areas, not only 
condemned any peace effort with Israel, but also its 
resistence. It claimed that it was a wing of the Muslim 
brotherhood in Palestine and insisted the Palestinian 
problem in Istomic. It further said that the liberation of 
Palestine was not only national obligation; it was also a 
religious duty and that could be accomplished only through 
armed struggle. 
, , role of VIOLENCE 
42. ATRAN (Scott). Stones against the iron first, terror 
within the Nation: Alternating structures of violence and 
cultural identity in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Politics and Society. 18, 4; 1990, December; 481-526. 
The framework of the Israeli-Palestinian Arab 
conflict has evalued over the last half century through an 
instrumentalization of violence by the parties concerned. 
Both structure of violence have a three fold character. 
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(1) a material goal judged as a cause for violence (2) 
Institutional modes of violence that delimit the scope and 
limits of its application (3) a moral imperative that 
defines the Ethics of violence. It is with the elaboration 
of this ideology that this article is concerned. The task 
for peace is to stop what has become an alternating 
structure of violence at a lull in the conflict when each 
camp can recognize and tolerate the other as an abiding 
stranger within. 
.ISRAEL, DEFENCE POL I CY,_and_ INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
43. BERES(Louis Rene). Israel, force, and international law: 
Assessing anticipatory self-defence. Jerusalem Journal of 
International Relations. 13, 2; 1991, June; 1-14. 
In the light of grave security threats that Israel 
continues to face, preemption, subject to certain 
conditions and constraints, might be an entirely 
permissible option under international law. Even, if 
intended to case Israel's security situation, the creation 
of a Palestinian state in the territories could well 
increase the probability of Israel's resorting to a 
defensive first strike against Arab countries. Any such 
outbreak contains the possibility of escalation to the 
nuclear level. 
, , FOREIGN POLICY 
44. COHEN (Raymond). Israel's storry eyed foreign Policy. 
Middle EAst Quaterly.l, 2; 1994, June; 28-41. 
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Israel's foreign Policy has always appeared to rest 
on orogmatic principles, the primary of the national 
interest/ a non-ideological approach to co-operation, 
tactical flexibility. More profoundly, the means and Ends 
of Zionist Policy have relfected a Philosophy of 
"unrealism", key decisions, from the choice of Palistine 
in 1897, via the declaration of the state in 1948, and the 
decision for war in 1967, were grounded in faith as much 
as calculation. Zinonism's External discourse, moreever, 
has displayed several unsual features, that Israel is held 
in trust for the Jewish people every where, that the 
state, exists to pratect and succor all fews whatever 
their citizenship, that special relations with us are of 
transcendental and not simply instrumental significance; 
that Israel is pitted against eternal enimies, that its 
army is an instrument of redempting as much as a means of 
defensive. 
GULF WAR 
45. TELHAMI (Shibley). Israeli foreign policy after the Gulf 
war. Middle East Policy. 1, 2; 1992; 85-95. 
Despite the advantageous position gained by the Gulf 
War, Israel still faces several factors which undermine 
its strategic confidence. The possibility that UN 
resolutions could be applied to its occupied territories 
and that the US would no longer view it as a strategic 
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ally, along with economic difficulties/ blurs the 
political picture. A review of domestic reactions to these 
concerns suggests that Israel must reassess its relation-
ship not only with the US but also with its Arab 
neighbours and other foreign powers. 
, , DEFENCE POLICY 
46. INBAR (Efraim). Israel's Continuing national security 
challanges. Strategic Review. 23, 1; 1995 Winter; 48-55. 
The peace process clearly indicates that Arab enmity 
towards the Jewish state is weakening and that positive 
changes are taking place in Arab-Israeli relations. Yet it 
is still not certain that the process will end in a 
regional detente. Furthermore, the myopic preoccupation 
with the details of the negotiations between the Arabs and 
Israelis blurs the larger Middle East picture. This region 
in contrast to others where the new world drastically 
improved the security situation, remains a "zone of 
turmoil", characterized by continuous security challenges 
: attempts to establish a new middle east order have 
failed; and the Middle East is still a region in which the 
use of force is widely considered a policy option and even 
receives popular support. Therefore, Israel must continue 
to denote considerable attention and resources to defense, 
if it is to preserve its security. The main variables 
affecting Israel's national security are its regional 
strategic environment and the threats emanating from it; 
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its ability to deter and overcome emerging challanges; and 
Israel's freedom to act according to its ovm assesments of 
strategic imperatives. 
, , HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION, REPORTS 
47. COBBAN (Helena). Redefining Justice : Hopes for a lasting 
peace in Jerusalem. Journal of Palestine Studies. 25, 2; 
1996 Winter; 60-70. 
Israeli human-rights organization B'Tselem published 
a report on the Israeli governments discrimination against 
Palestinians in the area of land expropriation, planning, 
and building in Jerusalem. Among the facts documented wals 
that most of the lands expropriated by Israel in the West 
Bank areas annexed in 1967 as part of the expanded 
Jerusalem were "privately owned by Arabs". And, "some 
38,5000 housing units were built on this land for the 
Jewish population, but not one housing unit for 
Palestinians. In 1948, the Jewish-Israeli forces expelled 
all of West Jerusalem's thirty thousand Palestinians from 
that part of the city. Many have gone to the Palestinian 
concentrations just across the Jerusalem border drawn in 
1967 places like Abu-Dis, al-Izzariyya, and al-Ram that 
were deliberately excluded from the municipality to keep 
the Palestinian population at a minimum. Though these 
Palestinians still have blue pass books, they have never 
counted in municipal concensuses. The issue of justice and 
the prevalence in today's Jerusalem of its opposite 
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discrimination needs to be focused on with particular 
emphasis in the United states. Indeed a discussion of 
discrimination leads directly to a discussion of 
sovereignty and stands a much better chance of making 
impact on Jewish-American public opinion. 
, ISRAELI SECURITY, in relation to PALESTINE 
48. SLATER (Jerome). Palestinian state and Israeli security. 
Political science quarterly. 106, 3; 1991; 411-30. 
The security issue remains the most critical one in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli and their 
supporters are concerned that the Palestinians might 
regard a limited state in the West Bank as merely a first 
step to regain all of Palestine or that the powerful 
rejectionist Arab states could use a Palestinian state in 
the West Bank as a spring board for a massive invasion of 
Israel. The security argument is considerably exaggerated, 
especially in the context of a comprehensive peace 
settlement sponsored and guaranteed by the U.S. Infact, 
the creation of a Palestinian state would enhance Israel's 
security rather than endanger it by removing the major 
causes for Arab hostility towards Israel, and solidifying 
Israels allience with the U.S. 
, ISRAEL-PALESTINE TALKS 
49. WHO BLINKS first ? Middle East. 207; 1992, January; 
5-7. 
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As Middle East peace talks resumed in Washington, 
James Baker the US secretary of state, took a deliberately 
aloof posture. The Israeli and the Palestinians made a 
great pus about procedural matter which seem trivial, but 
may be more significant than they appear. 
, ISRAEL-PLO AGREEMENT 
50. TRIPP (Charles). Timing is Everything : The making of the 
Israel-PLO deal. Israel Affairs. 1, 1; 1994, Autumn; 
164-70. 
The September 1993 joint declaration of principles 
signed by the Israeli and Palestinian leaders and their 
agreement of May 1994 point to a eventual resolution of a 
complex problem. These acts demonstrate that in politics, 
one of the most necessary skills is the capacity to 
understand the importance of timing. Ideologies that were 
once defended as articles of faith are discarded when 
their futility is finally realized. Evidence of a change 
in outlook, a conversion to pragmate thinking and an 
awareness of international trends is apparent in recent 
publications concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
, ISRAEL, POLITICS, effect of WAR 1949-88 
51. BARZILAI (Gad). Jewish democracy at war : Attitudes of 
secular Jewish political parties in Israel toward the 
question of war (1949-1988). Comparative Strategy. 9, 3; 
1990; 179-94. 
61 
The main purpose of this article is to illuminate, 
analyze/ and explain, for the first time, the diversity of 
attitudes that prevailed in Israel between 1949 and 1988 
towards the question of war. The Israeli case is 
particularly interesting because of the fact that the 
Arab-Palestinian Israeli conflict continued throughout 
that entire period. The article's basic contention is that 
Israel is characterized by a fundamental rift, in the form 
of an ingrained pattern of controversy, over the question 
of war. Relying on primary historical sources, brought to 
light for the first time herein, I have discovered the 
existence of threle sets of attitudes reflects a certain 
basic outlook toward the implementation of military force. 
The study reveals the diversity of dilemmas and attitudes 
regarding the question of when, if at all, Israel should 
implement military force against Arab states and against 
the Palestinians. 
, _, SECURITY 
52. ZAKEIM (Dov S). Peace and Israeli security. Israel 
Affairs. 1, 1; 1994 Autumn; 13-26. 
There can be no denying that peace in the Israel's 
interests. Whether as not it can be sustained is a 
different matter. To increase the prospects that peace 
would endure would require Israel to maintain a strong 
military posture. Such a posture would have to take into 
account not only threats from states willing to subscribe 
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to a settlement, but also those that might revege on It. 
To do SO/ and not to appear unnecessarily belligerent in a 
post-settlement environment/ would demand that Israel 
expend considerable financial resources, to support both 
short and long range a system of deterance/ defense and 
retaliation. The magnitude of resources required is likely 
to wipe out any chance of peace dividend/ other than that 
which might be realized through increased military sales 
board. While the U.S. may be expected to exert maximal 
efforts to achieve a settlement, its ability to finance 
that settlement or to augment budgetary commitments to 
Israel is highly uncertain. Israel would have to resort to 
internal cutbacks necessiating painful choice regarding 
the cancellation of certain weapons programs. That however 
is a small price to pay for attaining a reduced threat of 
war. 
/ ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR POLICY/ effect of GULF WAR 
53. HARKAVY (Robert E) . After the Gulf War : The future of 
Israeli Nuclear Strategy. Washington Quarterly. 14, 3; 
1991/ Summer; 161-79. 
The recent Gulf War, featuring send missile attacks 
on Israel/ also brought closer scrutiny of Israel's 
nuclear arsenal. It is widely assumed that Israel 
possesses 200 or more atomic warheads. Increasing 
attention must now be paid to analyses and scenarios 
involving the use/ or threat of use, of these weapons. 
63 
This could involves tactical, battlefield weapons in a 
last resort scenario, or otherwise a response to Arab 
chemical weapons attack. Meanwhile the rapidly altered 
global political situation, featuring US Soviet denete, 
the collapse of Soviet power, and the trend towards 
European integration, will have major albeit not easily 
predictable, impacts on Israel's evolving nuclear 
strategy. 
, ISRAEL, role of RUSSIA 
54. FREEDMAN (Robert O). Israeli-Russian relations since the 
collapse of the soviet union. Middle East Journal. 44, 2; 
1995, Spring; 233-47. 
Russian-Israeli relations under president Boris 
Yeltsin in the 1992-94 period continued the sharp 
improvement that had begun in the final three years of the 
Garbachov Era (1988-91). Emigration continued at high 
levels, cultural relations blossraed, trade developed, 
particularly in the aglricultural sphere, and political 
relations became fully normalised. Despite pressure from 
the anti-Israeli right wing of the Russian political 
specltrum, Yelstin promoted ties with Israel while taking 
an "even handed" position on the Arab-Israel conflict. He 
also sought to exploit Russia's position as co-sponsor of 
the Middle East peace process to bolster his domestic 
position, particularly in 1993 and 94. 
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, VIEW POINT 
55. SIMONS (Jon). Rationalities of government and peaces-
Israeli thought on the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Millennium. 
20, 2; 1991, Summer; 143-53. 
Current Israeli thinking on the conflict is limited 
by its derivation from two incompatible governmental 
rationalities : the rationalities of raison Elat and 
"government of Populations", the author shows how the 
discourse of nationalism disquises the clash between the 
two rationalities. After demonstrating the correspondence 
between two rationalities, he argues that the 
incompatibility between the two rationalities on which 
these ideas are based readers Israeli conceptions of peace 
in coherent. The problem can be overcome only by thinking 
according to different rationalities. 
, JERUSALEM 
56. BEN-MEIR (Alon). Jerusalem's final status must reflect its 
uniqueness. Middle East Policy. 3, 3; 1994; 93-109. 
Jerusalem has long since established its final 
status - a city of freedom, the holy focus of three great 
religious, a city of hope, the source of biblical truth 
and symbol of social justice. There is no evidence that 
Israel will ever relinguish its sovereignty over East 
Jerusalem, nor are there grounds for suggesting that the 
Palestinians could in this respect force Israel's hands. 
The trade off, therefore may very well be reduced to an 
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Israeli agreement to the establishment of demilitarized 
Palestinian state with "special rights" for the 
Palestinian in Jerusalem in exchange for Palestinian 
recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the United city. 
57. ODEH (Adan Abu). Two capitals in an undivided Jerusalem. 
Foreign Affairs. 71, 2; 1992, Spring; 183-88. 
The future status of Jerusalem has long been 
regarded as the most intractable of issuses in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The parties in the conflict have 
long agreed to defer settlement of Jerusalem to a later 
phase in the peace process. However with the ongoing peace 
negotiations, now is the most propitious time to introduce 
constructive concepts. The approach described here builds 
upon a concept of Jerusalem that flows from analysis and 
diagnosis of the competing claims over a city, that all 
considered holy and that addresses all the parties. In 
this framework the issue of Jerusalem would be resolved 
not only as a symbol of peace but also as an embodiment of 
essence, assuming that the parties negotiate in a quest 
for a just peace base on UN security council resolution 
242. 
58. SHAW-SMITH (Peter). Arab-Israeli Conflict : The centre of 
Palestine. Middle East. 203; 1991, September; 16. 
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That is how one Palestinian describes Jerusalem and 
its feeling shared by most Palestinians, even if they have 
never been there. Author describe in this paper, how Arab 
resident's and all Palestinians have an uphill struggle to 
ensure that Jerusalem is not neglected in future peace 
talks. 
59. WHITBECK (John V). Road to peace starts in Jerusalem : The 
condominium solution. Middle East policy. 3, 3; 199 4; 
110-18. 
There will never be a lasting settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict without a solution to the 
status of Jerusalem acceptable both to most Israelis and 
to most Palestinians. If one admists that no Israeli 
government could ever accept a redivision of Jerusalem and 
that no Palestinian leadership could ever accept a 
permanent status solution that gives the Palestinian state 
no share of sovereignty in Jerusalem, there only one 
solution is conceivable. Joint sovereignty over an 
undivided city. The city would not be divided but shared. 
The "condominium" solution has precedents and is both 
workable and inspirations. 
, , LAND LAW, role of UN 
60. SNOW (Charles). Arabs take Jerusalem land law to UN. 
Middle East Economic Survey. 38, 33; 1995, May; 61. 
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The continuing row over Israel's confiscation of 
level in the Arab sector of Jerusalem has been exacerbated 
by moves in the US Congress to force the administration to 
move the US Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. The 
Israelis also tried to disuade the Palestinians and Arabs 
from resorting to the security council on the grounds that 
"the record of Arab-Israeli relations shows that dealing 
with the issues, even sensitive issues, between the 
parties involved is the best way to solve problems rather 
than taking these to the international arena. 
, LORD ACTION'S 1861 PROPOSAL 
61. FELLOWES (Peregrime). Middle East II. A proposal for 
Jerusalem. World Today. 51, 1; 1995, January, 19-2 0. 
It is possible as well as feasible to envisage a 
solution for Jerusalem based loosely on Lord Action's 1861 
proposal for the Vatican. Jerusalem would be constituted 
as an independent city state with agreed boundaries and no 
sovereign power other then its own city government 
excercising authority over it. With in the boundaries of 
the Holy City of Jerusalem, there would be set aside two 
extra territorial enclaves that would be Israeli and Arab 
national territory respectively, both embracing a 
sufficient area to include building to accomodate the 
national government of Israel and Palestine. The 
inhabitants would be autonomous; they would be free to 
68 
come and go, to ooarry on their livelihoods in the Holy 
City or elsewhere, and to govern themselves. Such 
recommendations for Jerusalem may one day become the 
cornerstone for peace in the Middle East. 
, , role of US 
62. ZUNES (Stephen). US policy towards Jerusalem : Clinton's 
shift to the right. Middle East Policy. 3, 3; 1994; 83-9 2. 
Ever since Israel seized greater East Jerusalem and 
the rest of the West Bank during 1967 war, successive US 
administrations have supported the international Gusensus 
that Arab East Jerusalem and its environs were part of the 
occupied territories and that Israel's unilateral 
annexation was illegitimate. Under President Bill Clinten, 
however there has been guild shift in the US position 
which has effectively endorsed exclusive Israeli control 
of the city and its surrounding areas. This change in 
policy at such a critical stage of peace process is a 
direct challange to international law and authority of the 
UN, undermines efforts by NGOs and others seeking a 
compromise which would recognize both peoples rights to an 
undivided city and threatens a peaceful resolution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
, , SOVEREIGNTY 
63. QUIGLEY (John). Old Jerusalem : Whose to govern ? Denoer 
Journal of international law and policy. 20, 1; 191; 
145-66. 
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The disputes between Palestine and Israel over 
sovereignty in East Jerusalem (old city) is a major 
obstacle to a middle East peace settlement. The old city 
is a part of historic Palestine* over which sovereignty 
resides in the long-time population, which is 
predominantly Palestinian Arab. The old city was captured 
military in 1967 by Israel/ which then purported to annex 
it, but the international community repudiated that act. 
Israel has also intensively settled its own citizens in 
the old city, an act also repudiated by the international 
community. The Palestinian Arabs still hold good title to 
the old city, on the dual grounds that it was taken by 
military force, and that it constitutes part of the 
national patrimony. 
, JEWISH PALESTINIANS, LABOUR MOVEMENT, HISTORY 
64. GOLDSTEIN (Vaacorn). Jewish-Arab Conflict : The first 
Jewish underground defense organisations and the Arabs. 
Middle Eastern Studies. 31, 4; 1995, October; 744-5 3. 
Bar-Giora, and Ha'shomer, were a part of the Jewish 
Palestinian labour movement in general and of the 
Poalei-Zion party in particular at the time of the Second 
Aliya. These associations were based on an ideology 
expressed in the phrase socialist Zionism. A parallelism 
and a match seemed to lie between these two components, 
but as in many liberal movements of a socialist shade. 
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ideologically as well as practically, absolute priority 
was given to the national element. In its wery nature and 
the definition of its role Ha'shomer, like Bar-Giora 
before it, became the avant-grade of both the Jewish 
labour movement in Palestine, the Yishuv and Zinoism, in 
defense of the Jewish national interests in the land. Its 
attitudes towards the Arabs derived from its avant-grade 
character and orientation. 
, JUDAIZATION POLICY-ISRAEL 
65. YIFTACHEL (Oren) and RUMLEY (Dennis). On the impact of 
Israel's Judaization policy in the Galiee. Political 
Geography. 10, 3; 1991, July; 286-96. 
Provides a critique of G. Falah's recent paper : 
Israeli Judaization policy in Galilee and its impact on 
local Arab Urbanization. Initially, an overview of the 
strengths and weaknesses of Falah's paper is presenteld, 
followeld by an evaluation of same of the assertions made 
in his paper against fresh evidence gathered in recent 
field research in the Galilee. In particular three topics 
addressed by Falah are examined in the present paper : the 
nature of Israel's Judaization of Galilee policy, the 
conceptual framework used to analyze this policy, and the 
impact of this policy on Arab-Jewish relations. The paper 
refers to "Israel within its pre-1967 broaders". The Arabs 
in Israel are citizens of the state and do not include the 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza. 
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, JUDICIAL POLICY/ ISRAEL 
66. ZAMIR (Itzhak). Courts and politics in Israel. Public law. 
1991; 523-37. 
In recent years, the supreme court of Israel has 
dramatically expanded judicial review to cover also 
political matters. This has been achieved mainly through a 
reform of the rules concerning standing and justiciability 
The court consider itself a guardian of the rule of law. 
It is therefore/ disinclined to reject applications of 
importance to the rule of law just because the applicant 
lacks personal interest in the subject of matter or 
because the subject matter is of a sensitive political 
nature. Accordingly, the court is now ready to review, 
interalia, the legality of acts of state such as decisions 
of the militry government in the West Bank and the Gaza 
strip. Emergency regulations : coalitions agreements 
between political parties concerning the formation of a 
government; and internal proceedings of parliament. 
, KNESSET ELECTION, effects on FOREIGN POLICY, 
ISRAEL 
67. ELAZAR (Daniel J) and SANDLER (Shmuel). 1992 Knesset 
Elections revisited : Implications for the future. Israel 
Affairs 1, 2; 19 94, Summer; 209-26. 
The turn about in the relations between Israel and 
Palestinians following the signing of the declaration of 
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principles on 13 September 1993 and the subsequent 
movement on the Jordanian and Israeli-Syrian fronts were 
clearly related to the transfer of power that had occured 
15 months earlier. The main question addressed by this 
article is whether the last knesset Elections could 
support such a major shift in Israeli foreign policy. The 
answer to this question is pertinent not only because of 
democratic values but entails policy implications as well. 
Analysis of the elections could indicate the limits to 
Prime Minister Rabin's ability to proceed politically in 
his conciliatory policy towards the Palestinians and to 
make radical territorial ccmpromise. The study examines 
the following factors in the June 1992 Electoral decision. 
The campaign/ the role of the center, the Ultra orthodox 
and the Arab vote, and the impact of constitutional 
reform. 
, , 19 92-ISRAEL 
68. SMOOHA (Sammy) and PERETZ (Don). Israel's 1992 Knesset 
Elections : Are they critical. Middle East Journal. 47, 3; 
1993, Summer; 444-63. 
The goals of this article to examine the evidence, 
and to set forth the rationale for considering the 1992 
elections critical based on an analysis of the structures 
and processes of the wider political behaviour. The 1992 
elections may prove critical if the labor government 
becomes an effective peace maker, it will however, need to 
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be secure in power. A labor government that has more than 
one term in office not only can reach a peace settlement 
but also can begain to implement it, so that it takes root 
and is not undermined easily by a subsequent liked 
government. Once accords between Arabs and Israelis are 
reached and executed new dynamic will set in that can 
transform the Israeli-Arab conflict from confrontration 
and adversity to a joint venture of pragmatic problem 
solving and conflict management. There is a plausible 
basis to believe that the elections may turn not to have 
been critical in terms of a stable realignment of the 
Israeli electorate behind the labor bloe and a significant 
move toward peace with the Arab world. 
, LAND, and WATER DISPUTE 
69. ELMUSA (Sharif S). Land-Water nexus in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Journal of Palestine Studies. 25, 3; 
1996, Spring; 69-78. 
The two issures, land and water, are interlocked. 
While water plays a role in Israeli territorials claims, 
the alienation of land has an impact on Palestinian access 
to water. The water arguments of those favoring the total 
annexation of the West Bank were most clearly enunciated 
in two advertisements placed in the Jerusalem Post by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the agency responsible for water 
affairs in Israel, during the tenure of Raphael Eitan as 
minister of agriculture. The advertisements cited two 
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reasons for retaining the West Ban; uncontrolled 
extraction by Palestinians would seriously damage Israel's 
capacity to pump water from its side, and the high risk of 
pollution, especially owing to the lacking sewage system 
in the West Bank. 
. LEADERSHIP, ISRAEL 
70. ALBUM (Andrew). Against all the odds : Pares bows out. 
Middle East. 258; 1996, July/August; 5-8. 
Against all pollsters predictions, Shimen Pares was 
ousted as Israel's Prime minister by the country's voters. 
At this stage, then, the prospects look breaks. A 
resumption of suicide bombings is an unwelcome possibility 
whilst a new and perhaps for bloodier Palestinians 
Intifada certainly cannot be ruled out. 
, , PROBLEM-PALESTINE 
71. CLARK (Kate). Who would succeed Arafat ? Middle East. 
258; 1996, July/August; 16-7. 
Chairman Yasser Arafat will be 65 years old in 
August. That fact, together with rumours of ill health 
prompt the question of who might succeed him should the 
need arise. Much would depend not on any king inside the 
Palestinians territories, but as the will and desire of 
Israel and the US who would be looking for someone who 
could carry on effectively. 
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, LEBANON.SYRIAN-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT 
72. RABINOVICH (Itamov). Israel, Syria and Lebanon. Inter-
national journal. 45, 3; 1990, Summer; 529-52. 
This article examine the evolution of the Syrian 
Israeli conflict in Lebanon and elsewhere and addresses the 
prospects of both a fresh Syrian-Israeli military clash and 
a Syrian-Israeli settlement. The rise of Iraq's power in 
1990 provided a new dimension likely to affects Syria's 
perspective. 
, MINORITIES, ISRAEL 
73. SMOOHA (Sammy). Minority Status in an Ethnic democracy : The 
Status of the Arab minority in Israel. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies. 13, 3; 1990, July; 389-413. 
It is commonly assumed that democracy in deeply 
divided societies takes either a majoritarian form. While 
the state in both types is ethnically neutral, there are 
some countries that combine viable democratic institutions 
with institutionalized ethnic dominance. The article 
introduce this third, so far not recognized, general type of 
"Ethnic democracy" and demonstrates its utility for Israel 
in treating its Arab minority. The tentions and 
contradictions in Israel's dual character as a Jewish 
democratic state give rise to five Arab demands that the 
Jewish majority reject : making Israel non-Jewish and 
non-Zionist, accepting Palestinian nationalism, lifting all 
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restrictions on Arab individual rights^ granting Arabs 
certain national collective rights and incorporating Arabs 
into the national power structure. The problem can be 
reduced/ but not resolved, by establishing a separate 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza strip for the 
Palestinian people and by according Israeli Arabs the 
status of a Palestinian national minority within the 
Jewish state. 
, MINORITY, ARAB, ISRAEL 
74. SANDLER (Snmuel). Israeli Arab and Jewish state : The 
activation of a community in suspended amination. Middle 
Eastern Studies. 31, 4; 1995, October; 932-48. 
The main argument of this article was that at the 
Outest, the Arab who stayed in Israel had been overwhelmed 
by the power of the Jewish state and failed to develop a 
Palestinian collective identity and communal organization. 
Their minority status, their isolation from the 
geopolitical centres of Arab nationalism and their 
predominantly rural life style inhibited their political 
activity. The loy status of Palestinianism, at the time, 
further hampered the building of a Palestinian identity. 
In turn, the absence of a nationwide Arab party inhibited 
their emergence as a viable active community in the 
Israeli polity. Moreover, there was always the unspoken 
fear that, because of the intense Arab-Israeli conflict, a 
mobilized Arab community would be suspected and this 
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trigger a reaction of the 'State' resulting in expulsion. 
The rise and decline in the strength of the Jewish 'state' 
provides a unifying explanation for both the paralysis of 
the Arab community and its activation in the wake of the 
Vomkippur War. ' 
, NATIONAL SECURITY, ISRAEL ' J^ Oi / O 
75. BERES (Louis Rene). Israeli security' in a changing world. 
Strategic Review. 18, 4; 1990, Fall; 11-22. 
For Israel, the essential requirements of national 
security have always been exceptionally far-reaching and 
difficult. Today, as the world continues with its 
incremental reaction to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait 
and associated threat to Saudi Arabia, leaders of the 
Jewish state recognize that Israeli security has become 
even more problematic. Taken together with the state 
uncertain implications to transforming superpower 
relations, the steadily worsening balance of military 
power in the Middle East could endanger the very survival 
of the "Third Temple", i.e. it could partent total defeat 
for Israel. In view of these circumstances, Jerusalem will 
soon have to make some important decisions concerning 
nuclear strategy and tactics and to assess the precise 
linkages between such decisions with the question of 
"Palestine" or the territories. These decisions may have 
to involve various forms of preemption, elements of 
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anticipatory self-defense compelled by ever-expanding 
vulnerability. 
1967-77 
76. BARNETT (Michael). High politics is low politics : The 
domestic and Systematic sources of Israeli security 
policy, 1967-1977. World Politics. 42, 4; 1990, July; 
529-62. 
This article examines the political economy of the 
states mobilization of resources for national security, 
called "War Preparation" and proposes a framework for 
investigation that consist of three elements (1) the 
objective of state managers (ii) the constraints on the 
state, and (iii) the policies of the state for mobilizing 
its required resources. Based upon these considerations, 
some tendencies in the government's war preparation 
strategies are suggested. The utility of this framework is 
exploreld through an empirical examination of Israel 
between 1967 and 1977. 
, , , role of US 
77. TAL (David). American-Israeli security treaty : Sequel or 
means to the relief of Israeli-Arab tensions, 1954-55. 
Middle Eastern Studies. 31, 4; 1995, October, 828-44. 
Israel's security concept in the aftermath of the 
first Arab-Israeli war consisted of two basic levels. At 
one level the primary influence was the history of the 
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Jewish-Arab conflict/ and at the other level, Israel's 
strategic situation was evaluated in concrete terms. The 
two-track security conception effected the reaction of 
Israel's defense leadership to the evolving relationships 
between the Arab states and two great powers - Britain and 
United States. The idea of concluding a security treaty 
with the United State supported by Ben-Gurison, he told 
his successor as Prime minister, Moshe Sharett, that in 
order to case the security burden. Israel should make 
overtures to the United states and Britain to enter into a 
'mutual allience' with Israel, which would guarantee 
Israel's borders for at least twenty five years. 
Ben-Gurion repeated the idea to Abba Eban, ambassador to 
the United States, noting that he favoured an alliance 
with the Americans, which would prated Israel borders. 
Israel's approach to the administration regarding a 
security treaty came as Washington was preparing an 
ambitious program to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which included guarantees for Israel's security. Ben 
Gurion said israel could contribute to American security 
by helping to fend of the communist threat, and in turn 
the United States would contribute to israedli security in 
the areas of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
, NEGOTIATIONS 
78. FESTE (Karen A) . Exploring negotiation possibilities in 
the Arab-Israeli disputes. Crossroads. 29, 1990; 75-93. 
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The continuous Arab-Israeli dispute has assumed 
some enduring and regularized features among them 
completing nationalism, power, enhancement through arms 
acquisition, mirroed hostile perceptions between Enimics 
and frequent violence. In general, the bulk of attention 
to this problem has focused on cause and party rationale, 
in an effort to explain why the conflict persists. 
Relatively little analysis has explored practical, 
realistic conditions that may help ease the path to 
successful negotiations to resolve the issue. This article 
examines theoretic perspective on negotiations, together 
with the historic record of solution plane, approaches and 
party positions in this protracted conflict. 
79. LEDERMAN (Jim). How to help the Israelis and Palestinians 
reach peace. Middle East Quarterly. 1, 1; 1994, March; 
5-17. 
The foundation stones of a ccxnprehensive Israeli-
Palestinian agreement will have to be fundamentally 
different from any heretofore used in pacts negotiated 
between existing states in the Middle East. There is a 
basic geopolitical difference between the situation in 
which the Israelis and Palestinians find themselves and 
the conditions that fix the value of agreements between 
Israel and ARab states. For this reason, peace making 
between Israel and Palestinians is going to require an 
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extraordinary amount of patience, time/ creativity and 
probably other peoples money and mediation as well. 
80. SHADOW TALK. Middle East. 183; 1990, January; 6. 
The best that can be said about the twisted route 
of Arab-Israeli negotiations on a settlement of the 
Palestinian problem is that they are taking place after a 
fashion. Two rules for assessing progress in 1990 : don't 
be optimistic, because Israeli politics are paralysed and 
the intifada may be turning nasty; but stay hopeful, 
because the momentum for change may just provide a 
breakthrough. 
, , and SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION, and 
ECONOMY 
81. DEADLOCK ON all fronts. Middle East. 183; 19 90, 
January; 7. 
Israel enters the 1990s with the little sign of 
fresh thinking on international or domestic issues. There 
is a little flexibility on the part of the existing 
leadership regarding negotiations with the Palestinians. 
At the same time, the country faces formidable internal 
problems particularly concerning Soviet Jewish immigration 
and the econcxny. 
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, SYRIA-ISRAEL, 1991-94 
82. COHEN (Raymond). Culture gets in the way of Syria and 
Israel. Middle East Quarterly. 1, 3; 199 4, September; 45-55, 
The protracted deadlock in negotiations between 
Syria and Israel from 1991 to 1994 is explained by the 
existence of powerful crosscultural dissonance rather than 
simply conflicting interests. Both, sides knew the price 
to be paid and circumstances were propitious. The parties 
communicated with different, codes, projected 
inappropriate assumptions on to each other, and negotiated 
by different rules. Syria's insistence that agreement on 
principles came first conflicted with the Israeli wish for 
discussion of detailed issues. Israel's instences on prior 
Syrian confidence building measures to win a round public 
opinion was contradicted by the hard-hosed Syrian 
reluctance to discard potentially useful bargaining chips. 
But the main obstacle to progress was procedural : whereas 
Israel traditionally preferred direct negotiations without 
an intermediary, Syria adopted for assertive mediation in 
the waster tradition. The role chosen by the Clinton 
administration, important facilitation, proved a 
second-best solution for both sides. 
, NUCLEAR POLICY, ARAB 
83. SNOW (Charles). Arabs agree to extend NPT. Middle East 
Economic Survey. 38, 33; 1995, May; 63. 
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After all the posturing and shouting about Israel's 
nuclear arsenal, the Arab states in the end joined the 
178-nation consensus which extended the nuclear 
proliferation treaty indentely in New York on 11 May and 
Israel did not. The 14 member Arab block headed by Egypt 
caused a last minute delay on 10 May when it presented a 
draft resolution calling Israel to join the NPT and place 
all its nuclear facilities under international atomic 
Energy Agency full-scope safeguards. But after the US 
intervention and no doubt considerable American arm 
twisting the Arabs ultimately agreed to a resolution which 
makes no mention of Israel but instead calls on Middle 
East states "without exception" to sign the treaty and 
accept IAEA inspection of their nuclear facilities. 
, / ISRAEL 
84. JAVED IQBAL. Israel's nuclear policy. Strategic Studies 
Journal. 8, 1995; 57-64. 
The roots of Israel's nuclear programme can be 
traced back to the political and strategic developments 
that took place in the Middle East in the immediate 
aftermath of the 195 6 Suez war. The Arab-Israeli arms race 
of this period was of breath taking proportions and it led 
to a virtual doubling of defense's share of GNP in Israel. 
The main purpose of the Israeli nuclear programme was to 
provide the Jewish state with a weapon of the last resort. 
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The Israeli leaders calculated that the possession of 
nuclear capability would help the Jewish state in two 
ways. One, as a means of obtaining American support 
against Arabs. Second is the nuclear option could be used 
to threaten the ARab states directly. Israel has, however, 
not signed the NPT while most of its Arab neighbours have 
done so. Israel's stand on NPT has been summed up thus 
"The NPT was helpful in entitling those countries which 
had already accepted the political realities of the 
international and regional order. 
, , , and PALESTINE 
85. BERES (Louis Rene). Question of Palestine and Israel's 
nuclear strategy. Political Quarterly. 62, 4; 1991, 
October; 451-60. 
If a state of Palestine comes into existence, 
Israel's nuclear strategy will be highly affected, as 
would the probability of nuclear war in the middle East. 
Israel's loss of a buffer zone would create an increased 
need for credible deterence and the likelihood of a 
pre-emptive strike. The more important question is 
Israel's willingness to use its nuclear deterrent. The 
credibility of this deterrent is diminished unless the use 
of such weapons is realistic. But if it is usable, the 
prospects for nuclear war are increased. Given this 
paradox, Israel should only develop a nuclear deterrent in 
the face of overt Arab nuclear threat. The question of a 
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Palestine states involves more than national self 
determination; it also concerns the survival of the Middle 
East. 
/ NUCLEAR WAR, REGIONAL 
86. BERES (Louis Rene). Israel, Palestine and regional nuclear 
war. Bulletin of Peace Proposals. 22, 2; 1991, June; 
227-34. 
The Palestinian question has important implications 
for Israeli nuclear policy and the possibility of regional 
nuclear war. The loss of the occupied territories could 
include Israel to persue its nuclear capabilities. A shift 
from ambiguity to disclosure would not necessarily enhance 
Israeli deterrence and could even increase the possibility 
of nuclear conflict. The credibility of deterrence depends 
on Israel's willingness to use its nuclear deterrent, 
which in turn depends on its calculations of Arab 
reactions. Such calculation assume rationality, which 
Islamic fundamentalism is undermining. Israel's increased 
vulnerability, however, makes the use of its nuclear 
deterrent more credible. Credible deterrence requires 
usables nuclear weapons, but this increases the 
probability of nuclear conflict. The demilitarization of 
Palestine should not solve this problem. Israel should not 
n^ 'rease its nuclear capabilities unless confronted with 
over Arab aggression. 
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/ OCCUPIED LAND, ARAB SUMMIT 
87. LABEUE (GG). Arab summit asks Israel to return occupied 
land. Indian Express. 64, 232; 1996, 24 June; 13. 
Arab leader's outlined their policies in a 
communique after a two day summit marked as much by splits 
among themselves as by worries that Israeli prime Minister 
Mr. Netanyahu wanted renege on existing peace agreements. 
The ommunlque specifically urges Israel to withdraw from 
the Golan, Lebanon, and Arab East Jerusalem which its says 
should be the capital of Palestine. As the basis of this 
demand UN security council resolutions 242, 338 and 425. 
The first two call for Israeli withdrawal from land 
occupied by Israel in the 1967 Middle East war, which 
Includes the Galan and East Jerusalem and the last urges 
Israel to leave southern Lebanon. 
, OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, JEWISH SETTLEMENTS 
88. EFRAT (Elisha). Jewish settlements in the West Bank : 
past, present and future. Israel Affairs. 1, 1; 1994, 
Autumn; 135-48. 
On the geographical background of the West Bank, 
the main Jewish settlement plans are discussed as the 
"Allon plan", the "Gush Emunim Plan" and the "Likud Plan", 
together with the characteristics of the struggle for land 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Israel's 
settlement ability in the occupied territories seems 
limited, both economically and demographically- After 27 
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years of occupation/ approx. 120,000 jews lives in the 
West Bank, as opposed to 1,050,000 Palestinians. The gap 
between Jewish political and territorial aspirations and 
reality remains wide and unbridgeable. 
89. PORTUGALI (Juval). Jewish settlement in the occupied 
territories : Israel's settlement structure and the 
Palestinians. Political Geography Quarterly. 10, 1; 1991, 
January; 26-53. 
Post 1967 Jewish settlement activities in the 
occupied territories are described in the light of the 
historical development of the Zionist settlement 
processes, and in the light of data from a field surlvey 
conducted in August 1985. The paper considers the 
implications of these settlement activities for Israel's 
settlement structure as a whole for the social geography 
of Israeli-Palestinian relations, and for previous 
attempts to build a theoretical framework for a study on 
the Israeli-Palestinian issue. 
, role of PLO 
90. LEVITT (Wendy Kristiansen). What's the mood in Israel ? 
Middle East. 194; 1990, December; 20-21. 
New vicious spiral of violence has erupted in 
Israel and the occupied territories. The massacre at Al 
Aqsa in October was met with fierce Palestinians 
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retaliation and several Israeli fatalities. What's more. 
The PLO's alliance with Saddam Hussein has not only 
infuriated the West but also damaged and split the support 
for Palestinian self-determination with in the moderate 
Israeli left. 
, PALESTINE 
91. GOTTLIED (Gidon). Israel and the Palestinians. Foreign 
Affairs. 68, 4; 1990; 109-26. 
In the wake of the Palestinian uprising in the West 
Bank and Gaza, a number of dramatic events have taken 
placee and both Israeli officials and Palestinian leaders 
have begun to draw the vague outlines of a possible 
solution. While it is still necessary to read beyond the 
hardline rhetonic of both parties, the "subtexts" coming 
from the Israelis and the PLO leadership in tunes actually 
converge on several points. Both camps have talked of a 
comrpomise involving a two or three way confederation 
among the Palestinians, Jordan and Israel such a construct 
would allow an end to Israeli rule over Palestinian Arabs 
treat the national and political rights of all the peoples 
involved while providing adequate security guarantees for 
all parties and defuse the sovereignty question to some 
degree by placing it in the larger context of 
international ties. 
89 
92. KHALIDI (Walid). Palestine problem : An overview. Journal 
of Palestine Studies. 21, 1; 1991, Autumn; 5-16. 
The crux and the kernal of the Arab-Israel conflict 
is the Palestinian problem. This is struggle between two 
national movement one is the Zionist movement and other is 
the Palestinian national movement. The Gulf war has 
negative and positive implications with regard to the 
resolution of the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israel 
conflict. The negative implications for the resolution of 
the conflict include the rift between the Arab coalition 
partners and both the FLO and Amman, the deeping 
reciprocal hatred between Israelis and Palestinians, the 
increased US aversion to the PLO, and American tensions 
with Amman. Positive implication of Gulf war for the 
resolution of the Palestine problem and Arab-Israel 
conflict include : the removal of the inter-Arab 
outbinding pressures from Iraq, the rapproachment between 
Syria and both Egypt and the U.S., the destruction of the 
Saladin Syndrome among the Arab masser the increased 
international awareness of the valatility of the Middle 
East and of the inter-correctedness of its conflicts. 
93. NIELI (Russell). Two-state binationalism in Palestine. 
International Journal on World Peace. 7, 3; 1990/ 
September; 9-28. 
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This articles looks at the present Palestinian-
Israeli disputes from a historical perspective beginning 
with a sketch of the view of Arthur Balfour concerning the 
rights of Palestinian Arabs to national self 
determination. Balfour's dismissive attitude toward 
Palestinian national aspiration is contrasted with the 
more conciliatory view of the liberal Zionist group birth 
Shalem, which was active in Palestine during the 1920's 
and Early 1930's. Continuing in the same spirit that 
originally motivate Birth Shalom, the author offers an 
innovative series of proposals that, if enacted, would 
enable both Palestinians and Jews to realize 
simultaneously most of their respective national goals. 
Two state binationalism is the term the author gives to 
describe his proposed plan, which envisions the creation 
of two nation states that would comprise a single dual 
ethnic settlement community. 
94. PARSONS (Anthony). Palestine problem - options for 
settlement. International Relations. 10, 2; 1990, 
November; 179-85. 
The Palestine problem is intrinsically intractable 
with each of two mutually hostile people claiming title to 
the same territory. Since 1967 the rough justice of 
partition has been replaced by the domination of one 
community over the other. Present prospects for peace one 
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blank. The liked government is resolved not to cede one 
inch of territory : the Palestinians are in revolt and the 
ARab world can maintain the present state of hostility and 
non-recognition of Israel for centuries- Even a labour 
government in Israel would only offer limiteld withdrawal. 
Perhaps a "Palestine/Israel confederation" is the answer, 
absurd though it may seem. It would reline the 
Palestinians of occupation, blur the problem of 
boundaries, gives Israel a stake in overall security and 
ease the question of settlements. 
, , DEMOCRATIZATION 
95. SHIKAKI (Khalil). Peace process, national reconstruction 
and the transition to democracy in Palestine. Journal of 
Palestine Studies. 25, 2; 1996, Winter; 5-20. 
Describe the three process and examines their 
interaction with special focus on democratization. The 
process of transition to democracy in the West Bank and 
Gaza faces severe challenges. The peace process will 
probably continue to affect it negatively. Particularly as 
popular frustration mounts when final status negotiations 
are deadlocked. The resolution of the conflict between 
national and democratic agendas will depdend on how 
decision makers order the hierarchy of their priorities,. 
Will the security related agenda, political independence, 
and economic well-being continue to take precedence over 
political participation, accountability, and freedom of 
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expression. The discussion of the article provided the 
answer to this questions but the next few months will 
provide more needed and critical clues. 
, , effect of GULF WAR 
96. ABED (George T). Palestinians and the Gulf crisis. Journal 
of Palestine Studies. 20, 2; 1991/ Winter; 29-42. 
The impact of the Gulf crisis on the struggle in 
Palestine will depend on the inherent strength of the 
Palestine national movement itself. This in turn hinges on 
the capacity of the current political leadership to 
Implement urgent structural reforms and to refocus its 
vision on the control issue of Palestine, and away from 
all extraneous concerns and distractions. 
, PALESTINE GOVT. 1948 
97. SHLAIM (Avi). Rise and fall of the All Palestine 
government in Gaza. Journal of Palestine Studies. 20, 1; 
1990, Autumn; 37-51. 
The All Palestine government established in Gaza in 
September 1948 was short-lived and ill storred, but it 
constituted one of the more interesting and instructive 
political experiments in the history of the Palestinian 
national movement. The governments fall was no less swift 
than its rise had been. For although it was projected as 
the nucleus of Palestinian self government, it was a 
phantom deliberately created by the Arab states, with 
93 
Egypt at their head, to meelt their publics opposition to 
partition and to challenge transJordan's claim to the 
residue of Arab Palestine. It was for their own selfish 
reasons that the Arab states created the all Palestine 
government and it was for their own selfish reasons that 
they abandoned it. 
, PALESTINE, GUERRILAS 
98. SAVIGH (Yezid). Turning defeat into opportunity : The 
Palestinian guerrilas after the June 1907 war. Middle East 
Journal. 46, 2; 1992, Spring; 244-65. 
This article seeks to reconstruct the attempted 
insurrection on the West Bank and to explain the rise in 
fortunes of the Palestine guerrillas in the post war 
period. It follows the leading guerrilla groups - Fatah 
and the ARab nationalist movement through the main phases 
of the insurrection : the debate over course of action and 
preparations from June 10, 1967, to August 27, 1967, and 
the active phase that followed, until the end of the year. 
Although Palestinian attacks immediately after the debate 
of June 1967 never reached the level of a guerrilla 
campaign, let alone an armed insurrection the mere fact of 
their action gave the Palestinian and Arabs timely 
psychological boost. The Palestinian guerrillas were 
embarked on a "project" of far reaching ambition : to 
situate their national struggle squarely on Palestinian 
sail and, thus lay the basis for autonomous action; free 
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from Arab central. The Palestinians were not to reenact 
their attempt to base their struggle firmly on their own 
soil until the eruption of the intifada in December 1987. 
, , in relation to POLITICS, INTERNAL, 
ISRAEL, USA 
99. HOLLIS (Rosemary). Israel en the brink of decision : 
Discussion, unity and cross-currents in the Israeli body 
politics. Conflict Studies. 231; 1990, May; 1-29. 
The recent initiative by US secretary of state 
James Baker, proposing talks between Israel and Palestine, 
exposed the divisions of opinion in Israeli society. It 
effectively brought down the government and highlighted 
the intense conflicts between the many different parties 
in the knesset on the subject of negotiations with the 
Palestinians the author describes the historical 
background to the complex situation in Israel and analysis 
the contradictory forces at mark there. At a time when 
most Israelis want to see the end of the Palestinian 
intifada, resolving the question is the first instance a 
matter for collective Israeli political will. Israelis 
find it difficult came to terns with Palestinian needs and 
aspirations, as well as settling their own differences on 
the subject of national identity. 
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, INTIFADA 
100. KRISTIANASEN (Wendy) and LAHOUD (Lamia). Waking up from 
dreamland. Middle East. 202; 1991, August; 5-8. 
For Palestinians, in Israel, in the occupied 
territories and in exile, the eruption of the intifida at 
the end of 1987 seemed almost like a dream come true. The 
long hoped for popular uprising was underway. Three and a 
half years later, everything looks very different. Another 
Arab-Israeli peace initiative has run into the ground, the 
Palestinian resistance movement is disoriented and so just 
as dispiritingly are Israel's politicians. The Intifada 
has come to its present sorry state. 
, , role of UNITED STATES 
101. BISHARA (Ghassan) . Impotence in the face of adversity : 
Arab regimes and the Palestine question. Arab Studies 
Quarterly. 11, 13; 1990, Spring; 303-14. 
While the Arab people have demonstrated for most of 
the last forty years their readiness to fight physically 
and otherwise in order to resolve the Palestine question, 
Arab leaders full commitment to this cause has continued 
to lag far behind. There appear to be two agendas within 
Arab society ; the peoples agenda, with the Palestine 
question on top of it; and the ruling elite's agenda which 
is basically its own survival. Despite the Arab regimes 
enormous expenditures on arms, they lack the will to 
advance the cause of the Palestinian people. The role 
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played by the US in support of Israel is of great 
importance in this regard. 
,STATE 
102. SNOW (Charles). Palestinian state in Gaza. Middle East 
Economic Survey. 58/ 30; 1995, April; C2. 
Israeli prime Minister Ytizhak Rabin says if the 
Palestinian would accept a state in Gazla in exchange for 
relinquishing their claims in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem or if they would agree to receiving a 
Palestinian state only in Gaza and leave the West Bank 
alone, I would consider it seriously. 
, PALESTINIAN 1967 
103. PEDATZUR (Reuven). Coming back full circle : The Palesti-
nian option in 1967. Middle East Journal. 49, 2; 1995, 
Spring; 269-91. 
This article examines and explain the initial 
choice of the Palestinian option made by Israeli policy 
makers, and the factors that led them to abandon it and to 
adopt the Jordanian option instead. An examination of the 
conditions and circumstances existing in the firsft? year 
following the June 1967 was reveals that the choice of the 
Palestinian option were poor from the outest. Despite the 
fact that Israeli policy makers believed it to be 
practicable, the Palestinian option was docnned to failure 
because of factors over which they had no control. 
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, PALESTINIAN CITIZENSHIP, ARAB STATES 
104. SHIBLAK (Abbas). Residency status and civil rights of 
I>alestinian refugees in Arab countries. Journal of 
Palestine Studies. 25/ 3; 1996, Spring; 36-45. 
This paper discusses the conditions of Palestinian 
refugees in their Arab environment with particular focus 
on their residency status and civil rights. It also 
examines the legal framework which by determining to a 
large extent the degree of integration of refugees in the 
host societies, has profound policy implications on any 
future settlement. To understand the Palestinian 
"conviction that stability and security can came only with 
a Palestinian state, one need only look at the two 
dimensions of refugees experience life under Israeli 
occupation and life in the Arab diaspora. Long years as a 
stateless people in a world of borders, passports and 
parochial forms of nationalism have made Palestinian 
refugees more determined than ever to retain their 
national identity in a sovereign state of their own. In 
addition without a collective regional approach and a 
through going revision of present legislation on 
citizenship and residency rights, there can be little hope 
for the economic development, openness and democratization 
that alone can create a truly peaceful Middle East. 
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, PALEiSTINIAN, effect of GULF WAR 
105. BAINERMAN (Joel). Cost of complicity. Middle East. 
197; 1991, March; 36-7. 
Palestinians in the occupied territories have been 
paying for the Gulf war by suspended Arab aid, cost 
remittances and an Israeli-imposed curfew. Israel was 
moving further towards economic apartheid and the steady 
disappearance of the Palestinian-Israeli political middle 
ground. 
, PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS, SELFRVLE 
106. ADNONI (Lomis). Palestinian Elections : Moving towards 
democracy or one party rule. Journal of Palestine Studies. 
25, 3; 1996, Spring; 5-16. 
Elections generally indicate a democratic 
processes, in the Palestinian case a democratic right has 
been permitted in order to legitimize a political process 
that could well lead to the perpetuation of Israeli 
control. The election also threw into relief the delicacy 
of Arafat position. While from the Israeli standpoint he 
now has the mandate the needs to reach a compromise on the 
final status of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, at the 
same time his legitimacy continues to hinge on his ability 
to symbolize the national aspirations of his people. 
Arafat own victory of 87% as well as Fatah's sweep of the 
Palestinian legislative council. Officially Fatah won fifty 
of the eighty eight seats, but infact it controls at least 
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seventy • when Fatah members who ran as independents are 
included also show, in theory at least that both Arafat 
and his party enjoy broad support still, the extent of the 
Pallincj violations re-enforced concerns in same quarters 
that Arafat is seeking to establish a one-party rule. 
, PALESTINIAN ISSUE, PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
107. BEN YEHUDA (Hemda Agid) and AUERBACH (Yehudit). Attitudes 
to an existence conflict. Journal of Conflict resolution. 
35, 3; 1991, September; 519-46. 
Patterns of continuity and change in attitudes 
within the content of an existence conflict are examined. 
Presents a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
attitudes, and applies it to the attitudes of Allon and 
Perse vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue. Differences in 
attitude between the two decision makers did exist. Yet 
Allon and Pers maintain common views regarding core issure 
in the conflict such as the rejection of the PLO and its 
demand for a Palestinian state, the preservation of the 
Jewish character of Israel, and support for a territorial 
compromise based on defensible borders. To be sure, the 
attitudes of Allon and Pers towardls the PLO were a 
perfect replication of an attitude in an existence 
conflict, and endused any possibility for reapproachment. 
However towards the Palestinian pepulation both showed a 
great deal of openness, and persistently sought a just and 
honourable way out of the circle of mutual mistrust and 
hostility. 
100 
, PALESTINIAN-REFUGEE PROBLEM 
108. KHASHAN (Hilal). Despairing Palestinians. Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. 16/ 1; 1992, Fall; 2-16. 
The endurance of the Palestinian reugee problems 
for more than forty three years is a clear evidence that 
it is not "biodegradable". The Palestinians can not 
integrate in the ARab world, nor can the Arab world allow 
them to integrate in the countries of their refugee even 
if they so choose. Massive resettlement in the West, 
though acceptable to them, is unlikely to take place. Part 
of the Palestinian problem lies in their relatively high 
level of national feeling, an unparalleled phenomena in 
the Arab world. 
, PALESTINIAN, role of GULF WAR 
109. ABU-ZUGHOD (Ibrahim). Nonalignment and commitment in the 
Gulf conflict : Palestinian policy. Arab Studies 
Quarterly. 13, 1 & 2; 19 91, Winter/Spring; 5 3-64. 
In the Gulf crisis Iraw had the full support of the 
Palestinians people as well as the Palestinian liberation 
organization. Close relations between Iraq and Palestine 
are an important dimension of the Arab national idea. But 
the close relations and collaboration did not produce 
excessive dependence or an alliance between Iraq and 
Palestine. Although Palestinian-Kuwaiti relations are not 
as historic, they have been quite intense and intricate. 
Palestinian policy that developed in the first two weeks 
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of August remained remarkably unchanged and could be 
summarized as : the Palestinians rejected Iraq's military 
invasion of Kuwait and held it to be in violation not only 
of the character of the Arab league but also of 
international law. They affirmed the right of the people 
of Kuwait to self-determination, and called for the 
pacific settlement of the dispute between the two 
countries. 
, , EDUCATION-HIGHER 
110. RIGSBEE (Lynn) and BILICIC (Joseph). Israelis-Palestinians 
and the politics of higher Education under occupation. 
Journal of South Asia and Middle Eastern Studies. 18, 3; 
1995, Spring; 41-54. 
As this paper shown, Israelis and Palestinians have 
extremely different views of higher education in the West 
Bank and Gaza strip. With each side viewing the other with 
such hostility, it seems imporable than any solutions 
could be found over the role of education in the 
territories. Yet the most obvious solution is the end of 
the occupation, which appears to be an approaching 
reality. In the meantime, strong consideration should be 
given to having Israel forces leave the university 
communities after the Gaza strip and Jericho came under 
Palestinian control. Until this occurs, there are several 
temporary solutions that could make life for the 
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universities under occupation easier, provided Israel is 
prepared to make compromises over the issues of conflict. 
, , PROBLEMS 
111. KHALID (Ahmad S). Palestinians : Current dilemmas, future 
challanges. Journal of Palestine Studies. 24, 2; 1995, 
Winter; 5-32. 
To change the extent rules of Palestinian politics, 
to build to institutions, to limit the powers of the 
executive, to avoid extreme centralization and 
individualism in dusion making to correct the 
administrative chaos, and to inject higher standards of 
public accountability are worthy and desirable goals. But 
the Palestinians cannot afford to while currently the 
common response. In the end, nothing can make up for what 
the Palestinians have lost, but nothing can be gained in 
futile pursuit of the past either. What is needed from 
israel is not self right housness in peace but rather a 
genuine appreciations of how the Palestinians are willing 
to look forward, not back. 
, STATE, ISRAEL PERSPECTIVE 
112. GOLAN (Galia). Palestinian state from an Israeli point of 
view. Middle East Policy. 3, 1; 1994; 56-69. 
With the September 1993 agreements, Israel has 
recognized both the Palestinians as a people and their 
national organization, the PLO. With regard to the 
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national rights of this people, however, Israel has 
committed itself thus far to only one form of expression : 
autonomy. The matter of the final status of the 
territories has been put off until negotiations due to 
begin in 1995. But the fact that autonomy is officially 
considered only an interim arrangement leaves the door 
open to the state solution, and indeed both the public and 
political cities in Israel expect a Palestinian state to 
emerge. The objection of most Israelis to the creation of 
a Palestinian stall on the West Bank is based on security 
consideration. 
, PEACE ACCORD, effect on PALESTINIANS, ISRAEL 
113. SMOOHA (Sammy). Arab-Jewish relations in Israel in the 
peace era. Israel Affairs. 1, 2; 1994, Summer; 227-44. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict is drawing to a close. 
The 1993 Israel PLO accords and the ensuing Palestinian 
autonomy re another step forward. It is opportune to 
speculate about the transformation of Israeli society as 
it moves towards the peace era. Peace will usher in quite 
revolution in society at large, and it will also recast 
Arab-Jewish relations. As a result of the legitimacy 
conferred on its Palestinian character and ties, the 
Israeli Arab minority will in Jewish eyes cease to be a 
hostile minority though it will remain a minority that is 
permanent, non assimilating, dissenting from the basis 
ideology of the state, disadvantaged in class and power 
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and problematic in status. In contrast to their brethren 
in the West Bank, the Gaza strip and the Diaspora who will 
become a sovereign majority in Palestine, Israeli Arabs 
will remain an Arab minority in a Jewish state and as 
such, cannot possibly be fully equal and integrated. 
, PEACE, and ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
114. VANDEWALLE (Dirk). Middle East peace process and regional 
economic integration. Survival. 36, 4; 1994-95 Winter; 
21-34. 
Although closer integration between the Israeli, 
Palestinian and Jordanian economies is now all but 
inevitable, a number of powerful obstacles make region-
wise economic integration unlikely. Most important among 
these obstacles are impediments within local Arab 
economics that make a transition towards more market 
oriented strategies problematic and the fact that economic 
development in Arab countries has often been hold hostage 
by local governments to longer and more immediate 
political and security concerns. The end of the cold war 
is likely to exacerbate problems of legitimacy for 
regional regimes. As a result, and despite the alleged 
resurgence of civil society within Arab countries, meaning 
-ful political change will also be held in abeyance for 
some time. Even if a comprehensive peace agreement is 
concluded, it will not necessarily lead to regional 
economic co-operation. 
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, and NUCLEAR POLICY/ ISRAEL 
115. BERES (Louis Rene). "Peace Process" and Israel's nuclear 
strategy. Strategic Review. 23, 1; 1995, Winter; 35-47. 
How will the Middle East peace process, a codified 
exchange of Israeli lands for Arab diplomatic guarantees, 
affect the Jewish state's dependence upon nuclear weapons. 
This urgent question, which has major implications for 
regional stability and regional nuclear war, is examined 
here by appropriately deductive elaboration of the 
pertinent hypothesis. Taking into consideration a number 
of critical intervening variables, this hypothesis is 
explored with particular reference to essential nuclear 
weapons functions; creation of Palestinian state; 
disclosure of Israel's "bomb in the basement"; Israel's 
decision on non-proliferation treaty membership, and 
Israel's counterforces targeting doctrines. The 
conclusion, however tentative and preliminary suggest 
strongly that Israel's ongoing commitment to the peace 
process will increase that countrys overall reliance upon 
nuclear strategy with all that such an increase would 
entail. 
, , compared with IRELAND and ALGERIA 
116. LUSTICK (Ian S). Necessary risks : Lessons for the Israeli 
Palestinian Peace process from Ireland and Algeria. Middle 
East policy. 3, 3; 1994; 41-59. 
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Israeli policy to implement decisions that protect 
domestic tranguility in the short term by forcing 
Palestinians to accept too stringent, delayed and limited 
a settlement may result in the colapse of the 
Palestinian's ability to enforce its end of the 19 93 
declaration of principles agreements. The intrinsic 
character of the process that leads to Israeli withdrawl 
from the West Bank and Gaza strip will determine whether 
future generations of Israelis will be left with a 
Northen-Ireland. Style problem of residual Palestinian 
national claims. Consideration of the ways in which 
Britain and France crossed the regime threshold to 
disengage from most of Ireland and all of Ageria 
illuminates the prospects for success of 
high-risk/high-gain strategy in the Israeli Palestinian 
case and the consiuences of trying to play upon the safely 
margin. 
, CONFERENCE/and PNC AGREEMENT 
117. KRISTIA NASEN(Talendy). Little tio lose, much to play for: 
West Bank. Middle East. 205; 1991, November; 9-10. 
The term under which an Arab. Israeli peace 
Conference will take place have caused serious misgivings 
in the occupied territories. The PNC agreement albeit 
qualified to attend the quitening the debate and 
consopidating support around the diplomatic efforts being 
led by Feisal Husseini and Haunau Ashrawi. The majority of 
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Palestinians will continue to give them their support but 
without raised expections. 
, , PROPOSALS 
118. JUST WHO is fighting who. "5 Middle East. 204; 1991, 
October; 11-12. 
US secretary of STate, James Baker wants to hold a 
middle East peace conference. Before a conference takes 
place, the Israelis want a restatement of the US position 
on excluding the PLO, on a rejection of a Palestinian 
state and on relegation of the United Nations to the role 
of a "silent Partner". The Palestinians, on the other 
hand, want a similarly clear statement of US support for 
UN Secretary council resolutions 242 and 338 which will 
require Israeli withdrawal from territory occupied in 
1967, as well as a halt to settlements in the occupied 
territories. Hanan Ashrawi, a Palestinian university 
Professor who has been a member of the delegations meeting 
James Baker on his trip to the Middle East, has warned 
Palestinians eager to get down to talks against "Excessive 
Pragmalism" in negotiations. "We have no authority to sign 
away basic rights" She declares. "These rights belong to 
future generations." Both the Arabs and the Israelis 
continue to take the high moral ground on matters of 
national rights. 
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, role of US 
119. ABU-FADIL(Magda) and KRISTIANASEN(Wendy). Will they, wont 
they? Middle East. 205; 1991, November; -5-10. 
James Baker, the US SEcretary of State, has made 
indefatigable efforts to bring together a peace conference 
between Israel, its Arab neighbours and the Palestinian. 
He can certainly be given due credit for trying. Probably 
harder and more determinedly than any other US peace 
broker. There are still major obstacles to holding a 
conference which can claim any sort of success, the 
biggest of wh ich is the issues of Palestinian 
representation. Yasser Arafat the PLO leader, has won his 
organisation's cautions backing for seeking some form of 
participation. 
120. POINT SCORING is the peace game. Middle East. 203; 
1991, September; 14-5. 
In October, an Arab-Israeli peace Conference may 
take place that in itself will be an Extraordinary 
achievement for James Baker, the US secretary of state, 
reflecting the changed circumstances in the Middle East 
since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The diplomatic tussel 
going on now is less about making the Conference a 
success, and more about looking good if it turns out to be 
a fiasco. 
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, role of US GOVT. 
121. ABU-FADIL{Magda). Don't raise your hopes. Middle East. 
199; 1991, May; 10-14. 
James BAker, the US secretary of state, visited 
Middle East twice in two months to provide fresh impetus 
to Arab-Israel negociations. Israeli officials have been 
emitting mixed signals on where they stand regarding a 
peace conference and intially April floated atrial balloon 
proposing a preparatory regional conference. Probably in 
cairo-grouping Israel and the Arabs as a preclude to 
bilateral negociations. An over all peace conference, 
sponsored by the United states and the Soviet Union, could 
them be held this summer in Washington.With sovereignity 
for the occupied territories to be settled after five 
years of autonomy in those areas. Israeli army radio also 
reported that the US and Israel had agreed during Bakers 
second visit that the final objective of a regional peace 
process would not be the creation of a Palestinian State. 
A sore point between Israel and the US has been the issue 
of Jewish settlements in the territories. Shamir told 
Israeli television after his meeting with Baker that 
Israel would continue to build settlements and that it was 
"an issue that has nothing to do with the negotiations 
between US and the Arabs. On 18 March, Ariel Sharon said 
Israel was preparing to almost double the number of its 
settlers on the Golan Heights from 11,000 to 20,000 
residents. 
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, PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI POLICY 
122. CHRSTISON(Kathleen). Splitting the difference: The 
Palestinian-Israeli Policy of James Baker. Journal of 
Palestine Studies. 24, 1, 1994, Autumn; 39-50. 
Any assessment of James Baker's accomplishments in 
the Palestinian-Israeli arena must be mixed. On the one 
hand, his achievement in bringing all parties to the 
conflict together in a comprehensive peace conference for 
the first time since Israel's creation was a major break 
through. On the other hand, his accomplishments are 
diminished by a failure of vision and an imperfeet 
understanding of both Arabs and Israel's. 
, , effect on ECONOMY. 
12 3. KANOVSKY(Eliyahu). Will Arab-Tsraeli peace bring 
prosperity ? Middle East Quarterly. 1,2; 1994; 3-10. 
The cessation of hostilities and blood shed is a 
supreme benefit in its own right, with or without economic 
benefit looking strictly at the Economic dimension, 
however, the peace agreements are likely to bring only 
limited Economic benefits. The promise of peace leading to 
prosperity made by Anwar as Sadat in the 1970s raised 
expectations that were not fulfilled, and if one believes 
the hype, there is a distinct danger that this secnario 
may be repeated in the middle east. That disappointment 
may well become a major obstacle to the durability of 
peace accords. 
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, effect on GOVERNMENTS, AFRICA. 
124. NORTON(Augustus Richard) and WRIGH(Robin). Post-peace 
crisis in the Middle East. Survival. 36, 4; Winter, 
1994-95; 7-20. 
The US-led mediation between Israel and the Arab 
world will not mean an end to dramatic change in the 
region. Ironically, the peace-process is instead likely to 
open the way for a series of challanges within several 
states from North Africa and the Middle heartland and to 
the Persian Gulf. The major forces of change will be 
Emerging Islamist and liberal movements that are already 
altering the region's Political Spectrum. The dynamics of 
change-which will emerge in the form of demands for 
Economic liberalisation. Political reform and a more 
independent civil society. Will pose enormous challanges 
for some of the World's most anti-democratic and resistant 
regimes. Facing difficult c hoices. Western Policy-makers 
must promote democratisation despite the temptation to opt 
for the status quo. 
, , effect of SETTLEMENTS, OCCUPIED LAND. 
125. KRISTIAN ASEN (Wendy). While nobody's looking. Middle 
East. 200; 1991, June; 20. 
A major factor in running the united states latest 
Arab-Israeli peace initiative into the ground has been the 
Israeli government's insistence on continuing to create 
settlements in the occupied Territories. 
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, GOLAN HIGHTS 
126. BEN-MEIR(Alon). Israeli-Syrian battle for equitable peace. 
Middle East Policy. 3, 1; 1994; 70-83. 
Since their capture by Israel in 1967, the Golan 
heights have come to symbolize for both Israel and Syria 
more than important strategic territory. For the majority 
of Israelis, the Golan is synonymous with national 
security, whereas for Damascus its restoration to Syrian 
Sovereignity is the single most critical act that would 
remove the stigma of the 1967 War and restore Syria 
national pride. A careful examination of the Israeli and 
Syrian positions and consideration of the new geopolitical 
dynamics of the Middle East in the post cold war era will 
show that : (1) Full withdrawal for full peace" renains 
the only viable option if Israel is to preserve its 
national security and Syria's sovereignity is to be 
restored over the Golan (2) While a renewed Israeli-Syrian 
conflict is possible, neither could improve their position 
dramatically. Hence the diplomatic battle for equitable 
peace and how the Israeli-Syrian agreement might be 
framed. 
, , , SYRIA. 
127. NEFF{Donald). Israel - Syria: Conflict at the Jordan river 
1949-1967. Journal of Palestine Studies. 23, 4; 1994, 
Summer; 26-40. 
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There is an adage in the middle east that war 
against Israel is impossible without Egypt and peace is 
impossible without Syria. This helps explain the Efforts 
by the US to engage Israel and Syria is serious peace 
talks. At issue is Israel's continuing occupation of the 
Golan heights. Citing constant Syrian artillery attacks 
from the heights prior to 1967. Israel contends that the 
Golan is vital to its security. But the guide to 
understanding the security issue facing the two countries 
lies not on the heights themselves but in the valley 
below, where the Syrian-Israeli conflict played out inthe 
twenty years between the 1948 was and the Golan's capture 
in 1967. There the front line rune through the midst of 
the Jordan river system. As the current peace process 
grapples with the basis of security, it is relevant to 
examine what happend along that frontier and the mounting 
violence that culminated in the 1967 war. 
, , JORDAN 
128. BOOKMILLER (Robert J). Approaching the Rubicon : Jordan 
and the peace process. SAIS Review. 14, 2; 1994, Stmimer-
Fall; 109-23. 
With the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO 
and the beginning of a Palestinian authority in Gaza and 
Jericho, the question for Jordan is not whether it should 
make peace with Israel but when the formal pealcejrf.ll be 
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negotiated and what from It will take. King Hussain is by 
nature conservative; he rarely takes risks. This prudent 
approach has been the key to the survival of his regime. 
Before taking the momentous step of concluding peace with 
Israel, the king must weigh significant internal and 
external considerations. 
, , LAND EXCHANGE 
129. HALLAJ (Muhammad). Breaking the Statemate : A Palestinian 
view. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. 
14, 1; 1990, Fall; 82-92. 
Over the past twenty years, the Arabs, including 
the Palestinians, have come to recognize the necessity of 
compromise in the search for away to reconcile Palestinian 
rights and Israels needs. They have abandoned earlier 
exclusivist claims to Palestine, and have come to accept 
an overwhelming international consensus from which only 
Israel dissents that the exchange of land for peace is the 
only way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. They have 
also accepted the principle of negotiating the details of 
that formula through peaceful means. 
, , MADRID CONFERENCE 
130. GAUCH (Sarah). Peace Conference : At least it's a start. 
Middle East. 206; 1991, December; 11. 
Nobody could have expected anything better. The 
Madrid conference on Arab-Israeli peace wound up early 
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last month after a lot of ceremony, gratuitous public 
rudeness and nowhere else to go. It left some of the 
participants feelings wrose and others looking better 
James Baker accomplishing the signal achievement of 
getting everybody to sitdown and the Palestinians for 
being able to sit down with anybody at all. Most pleased, 
however, were the Egyptians who came away with a sense of 
vindication that negotiation rather than rejection was the 
only path to pursue. 
131. MATTAIR (Thomas R). Arab-Israeli Conflict : The Madrid 
Conference, and beyond. American Arab Affairs. 37; 1991; 
8-29. 
On 30 October 1991 the Arab-Israeli peace 
conference held at Madrid. The opportunity for 
Arab-Israeli peace was manifest in the willingness of 
important Arab statas to extent he facto recognition to 
Israel through direct face to face negociations despite 
Israel's rejections of the U.S., Soviet and Arab 
interpretation that UN security council resolution 242, 
which stresses "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory by war" applies to the occupied territories. 
Despite Israel's uncompromising position important Arab 
states openly welcomed the peace talks arranged by Baker 
and urged the Palestinians to seize the opportunity. 
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, , , 1991 
132. ATHERTON (Alfred Leroy). Shifting sands of Middle East 
peace. Foreign Policy. 86; 1992; 114-33. 
The conference that opened in Madrid on 30 Oct. 
1991 is the latest step in the long search for peace in 
the Middle East. It had been 13 years since the 
delegations representing Israel, all the Arab states on 
its borders and the Palestinian had sat down together to 
discuss frameworks for peace. Why was it possible to bring 
all the parties to the table in Oct. 1991, when these same 
issuses had frustated earlier efforts? The political 
context within which negotiations take placle has changed 
fundamentally with profound consequences for the way the 
parties to the conflict as well as other parties with 
interest in the regions, perceive their relative power 
positions, national interests and options. The changes 
that generated all the formulas accepted by all the 
parties at madrid began with six day Arab-israeli war of 
1967, and continued with the 1979 revolution in Iran the 
1987 outbreak of the Palestinian uprising, the intifada, 
the end of the cold war, and the Gulf crisis. 
, HISTORICAL VIEW 
133. LEFEBVRE (Jeffrey A). Historical analogies and the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process : Munich, Camp David and 
Algeria. Middle East Policy. 3, 1; 1994; 84-101. 
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The politics of the Madrid peace process provide 
fertile ground for the invocation of historical analogies. 
However, the lessons offered by the Munich, Camp David and 
Algerian analogies are either in appropriate or have been 
overtaken by events. Munich's lesson, "do not appear 
aggression" might arguably be more appropriately applied 
to israel than the PLO. The Camp David lesson for the 
Arabs avoid bilateral negotiations and maintain a unified 
position has essentially been vaided by the bilateral 
Madrid peace process. The lesson from Algeria - "demand a 
place at the negotiating table and then do not compromise 
on the question of independence" has by necessity been 
lost by Arafat, who got a place at the negotiating table 
at the price of conceding 78% of Palestine. 
, , ,role of EGYPT 
134. PEACE CONFERENCE 12 : Egypt feels vindicated. Middle 
East. 206; 19 91, December; 12. 
During the recent Madrid peace conference, Egypt 
was glowing as Arabs and Israelis sat down at the same 
table in Madrid. Cairo saw its behind the sense 
negotiations as vital to pulling the disparate sides 
together. As well the Arab countries facing Israel in 
direct negotiation vindicated Egypts 1979 peace treaty 
with Jerusalem, a mouerevviled at the time by the rest of 
the Arab world. Although the meeting between Arabs and 
israelis seemed to be largely a victory for the United 
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states and the US secretary of state, James Baker'S/ 
shuttle diplomacy. Egypt to felt like a winner. "The 
convening of peace conference is a victory for Egyptian 
policy started by President Anwas Sadat". Said Salema 
Ahmed Salema, managing Editor of Al Ahram. 
, MASCOW CONFERENCE 
135. MATTAIR (Thomas R). Arab-Israeli Conflict : Bilateral 
diplomacy, regional violence and the Moscow conference. 
Middle East Policy. 1, 1; 1992; 55-84. 
A review of the difficulties involved in getting 
the Washington peace conference underway and of the 
procedural and substantive deadlocks which occured once 
the talk began reveals the disproportionali strength of 
Israel. While diplomatic efforts were being pursued, 
regional violence and intransigient Israeli politics 
threatened to jeopardize their success. The parties 
involved in the negotiations were unable to relach 
agreement on the agenda for subsequent talks, to be held 
in Moscow. Washington aloop role in the process was 
intended to force the parties to solve their problems 
alone. 
, , NATIONAL SECURITY, PALESTINIAN 
136. KHALIDI (Ahmad S) . Security in a final. Middle East 
settlement : Some components of Palestinian national 
security. International Affairs. 71, 1; 1995, January; 
1-18. 
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Palestinians security needs long undervalued in 
comparison with those of Israel / must be met in any 
genuine peace settlement in the Middle East, not only for 
their own sake but also for that of the durability of 
peace in the region. Key components of Palestinian 
security are discussed, including adequate self-defense 
arrangements, external reinforcement and regional linkage 
and the prospects for satisfactory progress towards a 
final settlement during the interim phase of the peace 
process are examined. 
, , NEUTRALIZATION 
137. KARSH (Efraim). Neutralization : The key to an Arab-
Israeli peace. Bulletin of Peace Proposals. 22, 1; 1991, 
March; 11-23. 
The development of the 1990s make resolution of the 
bitter feud between Arabs and Jews more feasible than ever 
before. The best means to break the deadlock of the Middle 
East conflict is through neutralization of the entire 
Arab-Israeli sector. It is important to analyze the 
essence of the concept and the factors which bear upon its 
political feasibility as well as delineate the proposed 
neutralization package and indicate the advantages 
resulting from its implementation. Neutralization offers a 
timely and unorthodox solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
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, OPPOSITION, H7VMAS,role o f LITERATURE 
1 3 8 . KRISTIANASEN (Wendy). For our C h i l d r e n ' s Ch i ldren ? 
Middle East. 255; 1996, April; 8-9. 
Award winning Israeli nonlist David Grossman made 
an eloquent plea for peace as Israel reeled from the 
series of Hamus bomb outrages which claimed 58 lines. Most 
of them Israeli in an unprecedented eight days of violence 
which bugan on 25 February and sharply called into 
question the continuation of the Oslo accord- Grossman's 
sober message was that we should not expect the accord to 
yield peace and security now, or even in the next ten 
years : peacle would be for his children and their 
children. 
, , OSLO ACCORDS, 1993 
139. KEREN (Michael). Israeli professionals and the peace 
process. Israel Affairs. 1, 1; 1994, Autumn; 149-63. 
From the Israeli perspective, the Oslo accords of 
1993 did not involve a cognitive change but could be seen 
as an outgrowth of the cultural traits represented by 
Israel's techneratic stratum. That stratum, composed of 
professionals and their allies in the political system, 
notably foreign minister Shimmperes, is known for its 
prediction for combining political caution with 
technological fantasy. That stratum, whose origin go back 
to the early 1950s has came under heavy attack by 
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political fundamentalists on both the right and the left 
to whom the right path lies in recognizing the tribal 
rules under which the Middle East has been operating for 
centuries. 
, , OSLO AGREEMENT 
140. SHLAIM (Avl). Oslo accord. Journal of Palestine Studies. 
23, 3; 1994, Spring; 24-40. 
This article deals with the mutual recognition 
between Israel and the Palestine liberation organization 
and the declaration of principles for interim self-
government in Gaza and jericho which they signed in 
Washington on 113 September 1993. The accord which was 
negotiated seretly in Oslo is presented as a major 
watershed in Israeli-Palestinian relations and in the 
history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the first part, 
the secret negotiations in the Olso channel are traced 
against the back ground of domestic Israeli politics and 
the different approaches of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin 
and foreign minister Shimon Peres. In the second part, the 
content of the accord is analyzeld. The third part 
examines the implications of the accord for Israels 
relations with the rest of the Arab world. 
, , , ANALYSIS LEGAL 
141. SHEHADEH (Raja). Questions of Jurisdiction : A legal 
analysis of the Gaza-Jericho agreement. Journal of 
Palestine Studies. 23, 4; 19 94, Summer; 18-25. 
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The "Interim agreement" called for in article VII 
of the Israeli Palestine declaration of Principles signed 
on 13 September 1993 has yet to be negotiated, but the 
detailed nature of the Gaza-Jericho agreement signed 4 May 
1994 gives reason to believe that it was intended to be 
the basis of the larger agreement. The 4 May agreement 
merits a more careful legal analysis that might be called 
for in an agreement of more limited scope. The central 
issue in such an analysis is now the legal situation 
previously in force compares to what was agreed. Three key 
areas are examined : legal jurisdiction, land and water. 
The most remark aspect of the agreement is the 
Palestinians apparent disregard for the legal aspects of 
their case. The PLO's inability to benifit from the 
experience of the first two years of negotiations with 
Israel is indicative not only of its failure to appreciate 
the significance of the legal component of formulating 
negotiating positions, but also of the absence of the kind 
of political organization required for such a task. 
, , , 1993, DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
142. DAJANI (Burhan). September 1993 Israeli-PLO documents : A 
textual analysis. Journal of Palestine Studies. 23, 3; 
1994, Spring; 5-23. 
In recognizing in the September 1993 accords the 
state of Israel the PLO recognized a "territorial" state 
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and a "sovereign" state one with executive, legislative 
and judicial "branches of governments" but with no fixed 
borders. Israel is return recognized the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people and decided to 
negotiate with it in the context of the Middle East peace 
processes. Israel recognized no right belonging to the 
Palestinian people, merely an organization representing a 
people that can serve as a suitable negotiating partner. 
By agreeing to renounce violence, the PLO has given a way 
the most important card that the Palestinians had to play 
clearly, the accords strengthened the Israeli and weakened 
the Palestinian. 
, , OSLO DECLARATION-1993, PROGRESS 
143. SNOW (Charles). West Bank redeployment unresolved. Middle 
East Economic Studies. 38, 40; 1995, July; C3-4. 
Since the PLO and Israel signed the Oslo declara-
tion of principles in September 1993, deadline on any 
number of items addressed in the document have failed to 
be met, and this has also been the case with the I July 
deadline the Palestinians and Israelis set for themselves 
concerning an agreement on the redeployment of Israelis 
troops on the West Bank. On 30 June, PLO leader Yasir 
Arafat accused the Israelis of using some 5,500 
Palestinians held in Israelis jails as hostage in order to 
extract more concessions from the PLO before the deadline. 
Arafat told a rally in Gaza "they are using the prisoners 
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as a card and as hostages to blackmail us to make 
concessions". The PLO leaders said Israel had proposed 
releasing 1,500 prisoners but only after the PLO signed an 
interim agreement concerning the troop redeployment and 
the election of a Palestinian council. 
, , PERSPECTIVE 
144. BOWKER (Bob). Conflict or co-operation : The Arab-Israel 
peace process. Pacific Research. 1, 3; 199 4, August; 3-6. 
Establishment of durable peace between Israel and 
its Arab neighbours will require significant perceptual 
adjustment. Israel is seeking the normalization of 
relations, but Arab audiences are not well prepared for 
this concern exists among Arab intellectuals and audiences 
that Israel is seeking security through regional political 
and economic hagemony. The capacity of Arab leaderships to 
address such concerns is complicated by the fact that the 
Arab world is undergoing a period of intellectual and 
political trauma. Greater communication between Arab 
leaderships and their audiences about political realities 
and the need for compromise is a necessary prerequisities 
to peace building. The political consequences of such a 
departure from traditional approaches to policy making 
could be far-reaching. Opposition to compromise is 
strongeslt and best organized at the popular level. 
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, PEACE PROCESS,effect on ISRAEL, ECONOMY 
145. ZILBERFARB (Ben Zlon). Effects of the peace process on the 
Israeli Economy. Israel Affairs. 1, 1; 1994, Autumn; 
84-95. 
This study has examined the possible effects on the 
peace-process on the Israeli economy. It has distinguished 
between direct effects that relate to the economic ties 
between Israel and Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank 
and Gaza. It has demonstrated that, due to both economic 
factors and political constrains, direct effect of 
Palestinian-Israeli interaction in the area of trade, 
infrastructure, industry and agriculture are likely to be 
quite limited. Indirect effects on the Israeli economy are 
expected to be beneficial. Two areas of improvement would 
be the establishment of trade relations with extra-
regional countries that refused to trade with Israel in 
the past, and the possible increase in foreign direct 
investment. Contrary to public statements by some 
politicians, trade between Israel and the neighbouring 
Arab states would be relatively limited. 
, , PALESTINE 
146. LALOR (Paul). Bending to the storm : Palestinian options 
in the peace process. World Today. 48, 1; 1992, 
January; 12-16. 
At the Madrid peace conference of late October/ 
early November 1991, the Palestinian Issue re-emerged as 
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the central problem In the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
moderates approach of the Palestinian delegation won it 
many friends. Palestinian policy at Madrid conference was 
preceded by months of fierce debate. In the minority camp 
were George Habash's popular front for the liberation of 
Palestine and Naif Hawatma's wing of the democratic front 
for the liberation of Palestine, other Islamic groups, and 
the Damascus-based salvation front, which remain outside 
the PLO. The longer camp was composed of Fatah, the 
communists, Yasser Abd Rabo's wing of the Democratic front 
for the liberation of Palestine, smaller organisations and 
independent Palestinian. The vast majority of Palestinians 
now see the proponents of armed struggle and "Greater 
Palestine" as dinosaurs in a modern world. 
, , role of SYRIA,and US 
147. ARAB-ISRAELI Conflict : Syria seizes the initiative. 
Middle East. 202; 1991, August; 15-6. 
If the United States is to make any progress at all 
in trying to bring the Arabs and Israelis together, it 
will be because President Assad of Syria decides to play 
ball. President Bush seems now largely concerned to show 
that he has done his best and Israel's Prime Ministers 
Yitzhak Shamir, is intent on doing nobody any favours. 
Meanwhile, the focus of the confrontation has moved much 
to Syria's diplomatic advantage, back to south Lebanon. 
Rya Crocker, the US ambassador in Beirut, was quoted as 
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saying that Washington supported "the extension of state 
authority over all Lebanese territory". That implies 
recognition of Syrian hegemony over the country and 
directly challanges the legitimacy of Israel's presence in 
the south. 
, PEACE PROSPECTS 
148. Peace with Israel means recognizing the Jewish 
state as a sovereign political entity, some thing that 
Arabs have been conditioned not to accept. Most official 
Arab reactions to the September 1993 Israel-PLO agreement 
on a declaration of principles for peace have been 
impressively positive. This reaction followed a similarly 
positive disposition to the American sponsored peace 
process, launched formally in Madrid in October 1991, 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
coalition victory in the Gulf war. 
149.LEVITT (Wendy Kristianasen). Time for reflection. 
Middle EAst. 252; 1996, January; 10-1. 
The start of a new year gives pause to reflect on 
the progress of the last year towards peace between Israel 
and the Palestinians and to look ahead to the hopes and 
pears that lie ahead in 1996. 
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150. TOWARD PEACE in West Asia. Hindu. 119, 151; 1996, 25 
June; 6. 
The Israeli Prime Minister should know that quite a 
number of other countries beyond the Arab world would 
wholly endorse the reasonable demand made at the Cairo 
summit that he should re-examine his approach to the 
issues which have been in dispute. Part of the campaign 
rhetoric of Mr. Metan Yahu is his refusal to restore the 
Galan heights to Syria. If the Israeli Prime Minister is 
going to stack to his refusal to agree to the re-division 
of Jerusalem and to his objective to expand Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank, he will only return West 
Asia to a quagmire from which Mryasler Arafat and the 
previous Prime Minister of Israel have been trying to lift 
it. The replacement of the "Land for peace" formula which 
he is reported to be seeking is bound to negate even the 
far from substantial gains which the Palestinians had so 
far been able to achieve for themselves. In striking 
contrast to the still positions which Mr. Hetanyahu had 
taken in his campaign trail and which he now seems to be 
reiterating as Prime Minister, the Arab have been 
surprisingly moderate and have avoided the belligerence 
which useld to characterise their reactions earlier. 
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151. VATIKIOTIS (PJ>. Peace by the end of the century ? A 
personal gloss on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Israel 
Affairs. 1, 1; 19 94, Autumn; 5-12. 
So long as the responsibility for peace making 
rested on the shoulders of powers external to the region 
of the Middle East, the urgency of resolution was not 
felt. Eventually its became clear that outsider could only 
cabbie as broker agreements which lacked the prospects of 
longevity. It was necessary to shift the responsibility of 
peace making back to the local, prolagonists in the hopes 
that these would reach an accord and then see the 
assistance of outside powers of its implementation and 
survival. Negotiations culminated in the Oslo Agreement of 
1993, whereby Palestinians are finally being offered if 
not directly and immediately, at least implicity in the 
long term, something beyond the people's autonomy, namely 
territorial recognition implying territorial 
self-determination. 
152. WHAT PEACE process ? Middle East. 186; 1990, April; 
11-2. 
It has long been obvious that a final settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict can only be achieved if the 
parties on each side can agree on their goals, at least in 
the immediate term. In the past, the biggest stumbling 
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block was the fractionsness of the Arabs. With last 
month's collapse of Israeli interminably shaky coalition 
government, it is aboundantly clear that Israeli in 
decision is now the true obstacle. 
1991-92 
15 3. PROSPECTS FOR Arab-Israel peace. Strategic Survey. 
1991-92; 84-93. 
That the beginning of an Arab-Israeli peace process 
emerged from the Gulf war cannot be disputed. The most 
obvious outcome of the war as it affected the possibility 
of Arab-Israeli peace talks was the temporary reduction of 
the likelihood of a new Arab-Israeli war. This second Gulf 
war largely neutralized the Arabs capacities to form an 
effective eastern front which historically comprised 
Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. Iraq was essentially disarmed. 
Jordan was weakend on compromised by its stance and Syria 
became a member of the same allience in which Israel was a 
silent participant. This meant that all sides could at 
least temporarily consider possibilities of a peace 
process that involved talking acceptable risk. The 
negotiation process was to be launched by an international 
conference that had special significance for the American 
policy planners. Whatever the short form fate of this 
peace process, it was clear by early 1992 that much had 
changed in the fundamentals of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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Perhaps most significantly, the Arab-Israeli peace process 
was now a multitrack, multistate operation. And the US 
were resolulity at the helm; the talks owed their 
beginning and continuation entirely to a American 
determination. 
, , 1992 
154. NEUMANN (Robert G). Year of Stalemate in the peace 
process. Middle East policy. 1, 2; 1992; 47-5 6. 
The year 1992 is unlikely to see much progress of 
any kind in the Arab-Israeli peace process. For the U.S., 
the pursuit of its national interest has always meant 
"land for peace" in the Arab-Israel conflict. 
Unfortunately, Israelis begin and shamir governments have 
pushed their settlement drive in the occupied territories 
with such forces that there is real danger of any 
compromise on the occupied territories becoming 
impossible. A labor victory in Israel's June 1992 
elections would make an initial difference but it is also 
likely to add new complications. If labor wins the Arab 
side will demand more, will want it faster, and will be 
disappointed when the US administration does not press 
Israel for further concessions. The Arab ought to jump 
into the trenches of discussion and negotiate in Stubborn 
point by point fighting. There is no escape from a long 
difficult process. 
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, POLITICS/ RIGHT WING, LIKUD/ ISRAEL 
155. BEGIN (Zecv B). Likud vision for Israel at peace. Foreign 
Affairs. 70/ 4; 1991; 21-35. 
Given thesituation after the cold war/ the gulf war 
and the indication of changing attitudes among some of the 
Arab governments, there is danger that false expectations 
concerning Arab-Israeli peace will lead to a repetition of 
past errors. Thus, to clarify the situation it is 
necessary to know the Likud vision for Israel at peace. 
Its Zionist stand is based on the creation of a safe haven 
for the Jewish national in the land of Israel, and the 
right of the Jewish state to national security. Upon these 
pillars rests the three-pronged policy of the Israeli 
government. The prevention of foreign rule West of the 
Jordan, an initiative to establish understanding and 
mutual respect between Israelis and their Arab neighbours, 
and efforts to reach peace treaties between Israel and the 
Arab countries. For an attempted diplomacy in the middle 
East, overenthusiasm is no virtue, and a cautions approach 
is no vice. 
/ PEACE/ RHODES and LAUSANNE CONFERENCE 
156.CAPLAN (Neil). Tale of two cities : The Rhodes and 
Lausanne conference/ 1949. Journal of Palestine Studies. 
21/ 3; 1992/ Spring; 5-34. 
Recently/ in addition to "Madrid", the wordls 
"Rhodes and "Lausanne" havle become more recognizable in 
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political discussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This 
article offers a summary of the talks at Rhodels and 
Lausanne based on recently released archival materials. It 
also attempts to illustrate some of the patterns that 
emerge with regard to such international attempts at 
Middle East peace keeping. The coaxing of parties to the 
table; the careful maneuvering by the Principal parties; 
the strategic used by the mediators in pursuits of 
consensus; and the recurring cycle of stalemates leading 
to a resort to outside mainly U.S. pressure. 
, , role of FRANCE 
157. WOOD (Chritina Pia). France and the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict : The Mitterrand policies, 1981-1992. Middle East 
Journal. 47, 1; 1993, Winter; 20-40. 
Over the past decades, Mitterrand's attempts to make 
France a key player in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process met with numerous problems. Perhaps most important 
was Israel's hostility towards a French role because of 
France's strong friendship with Arab countries and its 
outspoken support for the Palestinian cause. France also 
lacked the economic and political power to convince either 
the PLO or a reluctant Israel to blegin serious 
negotiations. Mitterrand had visited Israel on numerous 
occasions and established particularly closed relation 
with members of Israels labor party. In his second visit 
Mitterrand supports the Israel's proposals for elections 
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In the West Bank and Gaza strip and promised to propose as 
$ 1.23 billion EC fund for economic developments projects 
in the region. Mitterrand reaffirmed his support for the 
PLO and the Palestine state. The French government's 
support for Chairman Arafat remains a key element in its 
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 
, , role of MILITANT ORGANIZATION, PALESTINE 
158. CUBERT (Harold M) . Militant Palestinian organizations and 
the Arab-Israeli peace process. Terrorism and political 
violence. 4, 1; 1992; 22-43. 
The current Arab-Israeli peace negotiations have 
normalized frequent and open contacts between Israel and 
itsneighbours. This new situation is primarily the result 
of operation "Desert storm" and the USSR's dissolution. 
Both events forced the Middle Eastern states and 
subnational organizations to re-evaluate their perceptions 
of one another, as well as of the degree of support they 
might expect from their superpower patrons. This articles 
beings by examining the ways in which these events have 
affected those countries and organizations which choose to 
participate in the peace process and finally focuses on 
the policies of Palestinians national movements, 
specifically the group which are opposed to the 
negotiations and have bowed undermine them. 
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, role of PLO 
159. INDYK (Martin). Peace without the PLO. Foreign Policy. 
1991, Summer; 30-8. 
The end of the Gulf War shifted the balance of power 
in the ARab world decisively in favour of the Egyptian-
Saudi coalition that fought alongside the U.S. The 
devastating blow dealt radical Arab forces has left Syria 
with little alternative to staying with the winning 
coalition. These trends suggest that inter-Arab politics 
are likely to be dominated by the new axis of Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and Syria. This is an unarsaible coalition should 
it decide to settle with Israel. The most significant 
repercussion for Arab-Israeli diplomacy is that the 
leading Arab states no longelr insist on PLO 
representation in the peace process. With American 
leadership, a negociating process can begin. 
, , role of US GOVERNMENT 
160. KHALIDI (Walid). Half Empty glass of Middle East peace. 
Journal of Palestine Studies. 19, 3; 1990, Spring; 14-28. 
Poll indicates that the American public is well 
ahead of its political elite in evenhandedness with 
regard to the Middle East. The American government would 
do well to realize that the US is a much part of the 
problem as of the solution, and that it has moral 
obligations to the Palestinian no less than to the 
Israelis, current developments in ruling circles in Israel 
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do not leave much room for optimism with respect to the 
possibilities for peaceful settlement of the question of 
Palestine. It is hardly conceivable that the present 
Israeli territories will not be eventually incorporated 
into the Israeli state. 
, , role of US POLICY 
161. FULLER (Graham E). Respecting regional realities. Foreign 
Policy. 83; 1991/ Summer; 39-46. 
Violent confrontation and war have once again 
visited the middle East. The US must radically reassess 
both the roots of conflict in the region and the outlines 
of an emerging new order. To secure a lasting peace, three 
challanges must be met : healing the regional paranoia 
creating a new security order in the Gulf, and 
establishing the outlines of an Arab-Israeli peace. US 
policy now stands at a crossroads, confronting a choice 
between performance for "stability" in the name of 
preservation of immediate interests, and a policy aimed at 
the gradual transformation of very cause and character of 
conflict in the middle East. 
, PEACE SETTLEMENT, role of EGYPT 
162. CAIRO WON't let go. Middle East. 184; 1990, February; 
9-10. 
All sides in the protracted negotiations over an 
Arab-Israeli settlement seem to be getting led up with one 
another. Egypt, however, carries on with grim 
determination. 
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, PEACE, STATECRAFT, ANALYSIS 
163. DROR (Yehezkel). Statecraft as prudent risk taking : the 
case of the Middle East peace process. Journal of 
contingencies and crisis management. 2, 3; 1994, 
September; 126-35. 
This article examine the problem of uncertainty and 
its effect upon the decision making processes to top level 
politicians. It use the Middle East peace process as a 
case to explore the handling of uncertainty in state 
craft, and present a concept of statecraft as prudent risk 
taking, that is, carefully contemplated decisions taken 
with full awareness of the changes involved as well as 
opportunities. 
, , SYRIA 
164. ZISSER (Eyal). Asad inches towards peace. Middle East 
quarterly. 1, 3; 1994, September; 37-44. 
A close analysis of the Syrian dailies suggests that 
when it comes to the peace process with Israel, the 
government appears intent as preparing the public for 
major changes that the negotiations may bring and even for 
the possibility, however remote of peace with israel. For 
many years, the Syrian press expressed a radically 
anti-Israeli position, while the beginning of the peace 
process between Syria and Israel has not diminished the 
Syrian press's hostility it reflects four central facets 
of the regian's foreign policy (1) A commitment to 
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participation in the peace process and representing it as 
a vital Syrian interests (2) An insistence in demands that 
Syria considers non-negotiable, (3) An ambiguous readiness 
to recognize the price that Israel demand in return for 
withdrawing from the Golan, (4) A perception of the US as 
the party that must promote the peace process. 
, PEACE TALKS, between SYRIA-ISRAEL 
165. SNOW (Charles). Syrian and Israeli talks in Washington. 
Middle East Economic Studies. 38, 40; 1995, July; C2-3. 
After three days of talks at Washington's McNair 
military base and a meeting with president Bill Clinton on 
29 June, the Syrian and Israeli chiefs of staff ended the 
first round of negotiations covering security arrangements 
for the Golan heights, if and when Israel decides to 
withdraw from the strategic plateau that it captured in 
1967 and has since treated as its own. In its 28 year 
occupation of the Galan Heights, Israel has come to rely 
heavily on the water resources that originate in the 
Galan, and it is demanding guarantees from Damascus that 
it will not interfere with water that runs into the sea of 
Galilee. And regarld to Lebanon, Israel wants Syria to 
distance itself from Iran and put a stop to the attacks in 
southern Lebanon carried out by Hlzbollah. 
, , role of SYRIA 
166. SHAHIN (Mariam) . Syria stands apart. Middle East. 252; 
1996, January; 15-6. 
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As the realities of peace between Arabs and Israeli 
becomes more an issue of action than words, the coldest of 
Israel's enemies - Syria remains adamant in its stand to 
get what it wants or wait for the peace talk to collapse. 
, PLO 
167. GIBBINS (Penny). Bring out the Kalashnikovs. Middle 
East. 193; 1990/ November; 24. 
The collapse of the PLO's peace intiative, the 
ebbing of the intifida and Saddam Hussein's injection of 
revived bellicosity into Middle East politics is pushing 
the PLO back towards its traditional espousal of an armed 
struggle to liberate Palestine. 
, PLO-ISRAEL ACCORD, ARAB VIEWPOINT 
168. EL-DOUFANI (Mohamed M) . Middle East I : The PLO-Israeli 
accord - an Arab critique. World Today. 51, 1; 1995, 
January; 15-8. 
The PLO-Israeli accord is an unlikely framework to 
eventually meet the demands of the Palestinian people for 
a truely independent and viable state. It consists almost 
entirely of unilateral concessions on the part of the 
Palestinians and is perceived by many Palestinians as a 
humiliating beginning to the process of peace. This 
process will take at the very minimum five years, the 
deadline for reaching an arrangement on the final status 
of the occupied territories. The accord final goal, as far 
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as the PLO is concerned/ is the creation of a Palestinian 
mini-state on the West Bank and Gaza strip, but thisd 
should by no means be presumed. Nonetheless, the accord is 
an important step towards a permanent settlement, and a 
significant psychological breakthrough which has 
diminished a wide range of taboos. 
, POLITICS, CONFLICTS, ISRAEL 
169. BARZILAI (Gad) and SHAIN (Vossi). Israeli democracy at the 
crossroads : A crisis of non-governmentability. Government 
and Opposition. 26, 3; 1991, Summer; 345-67. 
Israeli politics is a composition of several 
problems : the territorial question, national identity, 
state and religion, the intifada and the Israeli army in 
the occupied territories, the question of national 
loyality, political corruption and the rule of law. They 
are the sources of the conflicts in the Israeli society. 
Thus, the tensions between Jews and Arabs are rooted in 
the definition of the Israeli nationality according to 
religious concetions. The tensions among Jews and between 
them and the Arabs have become more severe because of the 
Gulf war's repercussions and the massive immigration of 
Jews from the crumbling USSR. Due to the structural and 
cultural conflicts and rifts in Israel the state is 
suffering from a severe crisis of non-governmenability 
that cannot be solveld by mere parliamentry reforms. 
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, RIGHT WING, ISRAEL, effect on ARAB 
170. SHAHIN (Mariam). In search of a solution. > Middle East. 
258; 19 96, July/August; 12-3. 
There is a joke being told in the right wing cafes 
of Israel - it tells the tale of how it took the election 
of right-wing Israeli Prime Minister to reunits the 
divided Arab world. There is a certain irony to the story. 
, PSYCHOLOGY, AGGRESSION-ANNIHILATION, ISRAELI 
171. SHALIT (Erel). Relationship between aggression and fear of 
annihilation in Israel. Political Psychology. 15, 3; 1994, 
September; 415-34. 
From its inception, modem Zionism offered a Jewish 
identity of strength and courage as an alternative to what 
was seen as weakness and helplessness. Following the 
Holocaust, death anxiety was deflected into aggressive 
energy when combating the invading Arab armies during 
Israel's war of independence. The balance between 
aggression and fear of annihilation was severely upset by 
the threat of trauma repetition prior to the six day war 
and the resulting release of strength, power and 
aggression, which threw the country into a position of 
fear denying omnipotence. The illusion of this grandiose 
position burst in the Yom Kippur war of 1973, and the 
Lebanon war of 1982 was, in part, a futile attempt to 
reinstatle it. In encounters with the intifada, fear and 
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aggression have been fused internally as well as vis-a-vis 
the enemy, while simultaneously the borders of the state 
of Israel are being psychologically re-established. 
, role of ARAB-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
172. SHAIN (Vassi). Arab-Americans at a crossroads. Journal of 
Palestine Studies. 25, 3; 1996, Spring; 46-59. 
The Middle East peace process, and the spread of 
radical Islam have presented the Arab-American community 
and its mainstream institutions with a new crisis of 
identity and political purpose, forcing community leaders 
to redefine their domestic and foreign policy agendas. For 
the last three decades, the agenda of U.S. Arabs has been 
monopolized by the Arab-Israel conflict; indeed, given the 
diversity of the community in terms of quasi-national 
homelands, religions, and ideological persuations. The 
Palestinian cause could be said to have provideld the very 
foundation for Pan-Arab ethnic identity in America. 
, role of ARAB STATES, in relation to PALESTINE 
173. BRYNEN (Rex). Palestine and the Arab state system : 
Permeability, state consolidation and intifada. Canadian 
Journal of Political Science. 24, 3; 1991, September; 
595-621. 
This article elxamines the sensitivity of Arab 
states to the political and ideological repercussions of 
the Palestine issure by focusing upon Egypt, Syria and 
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Jordan. It suggests that the policies of Arab regimes 
towards the Palestine issure have been substantially 
shapped by historical patterns of state formation and by 
the gradual consideration of the Arab state system. This 
has served to "harden" the Arab territorial state, 
creating conditions under which Arab states are 
increasingly insulated from the transnational effects of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
, role of DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES GAZA/ and WEST BANK 
174. BRYNEN (Rex). International aid to the West Bank and 
Gaza : A primer. Journal of Palestine Studies. 25, 3; 
1996, Spring; 46-53. 
On 18-19 October 1995, representative of the 
Palestinian Authority, Israel, the World Bank, twenty nine 
donor states, and ten international organizations met in 
Paris. The purpose of the meeting ; to develop a renewed 
progrfun of development assistance for the West Bank and 
the Gaza strip in the wake of the 28 September signing of 
the Oslo II interim agreement between Israel and 
Palestinians. A similar meeting had been held in 
Washington in Oct. 1993, about the month after the 
Israeli-PLO declaration of principles was signed. At the 
first meeting donors pledged sum $ 2.1 billion over five 
years in support of Palestinian self government. The funds 
are intended to foster Palestinian economic and social 
development in the West Bank and Gaza as well as to 
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support the emergence of a Palestinian administrative 
infrastructure politically the man aim of these assistance 
efforts to strengthening the Palestinian authority and 
creating tangible benefits for Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza, thereby generating suport for the peace 
process. 
, role of IDEOLCXSY 
175. LIEBES (Tamar) and KATZ (Elihu). Ideological reproduction. 
Political behaviour. 13, 3; 1991, September; 237-52. 
A study of the conditions under which parents 
reproduce their political ideologies in their adolescent 
children, conducted in Israel, shows that (l)Parents do 
reproduce their political outlooks, (2) there is a greater 
likehood that hawkish parents will have like minded 
children than dovish ones, and (3) whereas the reproduc-
tion of doves is dependent on higher education, hawks 
reproduce regardless of their level of education, 
authoritarianism, or religiosity. The data are from 400 
parent child interviews. Cohort and intrafamily analysis 
are used to explain the change from generation to 
generation and the continuity and change within families. 
Clues to the tendency to move right are discerned in (1) 
the relative hawkishness of parents of 18 year olds who 
are about to begin, their army service (2) the relative 
complexity of dovish position, (3) the continuous 
Arab-Israeli conflict into which Israeli adolescents are 
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born and (4) the rise of the ideology advocating Israel's 
right to the territories conquered in 1967. 
, role of ISLAM/ SHARIAT, ARAB STATES 
176. HADDAD (Yonne). Islamists and the "problem of Israel" : 
The 1967 awakening. Middle East Journal. 46/ 2; 1992, 
Spring; 266-85. 
A quarter of century after the June 1967/ Islamism 
is the dominant world view among a large segment of the 
Arab masses/ who increasingly demand that the Sharia 
become the legitimate framework for organizing society. 
Islamists affirm the right to create distinctive culture 
that is imbued with the values of the faith/ the right to 
creatle an Islamic state as Israel has created a Jewish 
state. For Islamists, the danger facing the Muslims is not 
the "Palestinian problem" as much as the "problem of 
israel". Palestine is a central element of the movement. 
It is a demand for the right of a people to self 
determination/ democracy, and freedom, it is also a demand 
that Muslims be recognized as having full rights and equal 
status in determining their future. 
/ role of PALESTINE/ NGO 
177. SULLIVAN (Denis J). NGOs in Palestine : Agents of 
development and foundation of Civil society. Journal of 
Palestine Studies. 25/ 3; 1996/ Spring; 93-100. 
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Palestinian social institutions« women's organizations, 
charitable societies, professional and labour unions have 
existed for decades and are internationally recognized for 
their role in overcoming the challanges of Israeli 
occupation. The character of the state of Palestine is 
being developed now, as Palestinians individuals and 
groups begin to separate themselves from direct Israeli 
supervision and to "attach" themselves to the Palestine 
authority. A Palestine civil society, perhaps, is in the 
process of being developed. Civil society leaders have 
achieved a significant victory by successfully labbying 
against the Palestinian authority proposed MGO law. To 
move beyond the mutual suspicion and mistrust between 
Palestinian officials and NGO members representing a wide 
spectrum of society, Palestinians need to develop a social 
contact between state and civil society". 
, role of RELIGION,in PALESTINIAN UNIVERSITIES 
178. BARGHOUTI (Lyad). Religion and politics among the students 
of Najah National University. Middle Eastern Studies. 27, 
2; 1991, April; 203-18. 
Based on data of surveys conducted in mild-1987, 
religion is plyaing an increasingly significant role in 
the political thought and action of Palestinian university 
students. Among the factors determining attitudes towards 
national questions, prominent is the degree of religious 
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observance : the greater it is the lesser the involvement 
in political action, and thus also in imprisonment by the 
Israeli occupation forces. However this lesser involvement 
in political action does not reflect a greater willingness 
to compromise on national questions. On the contrary/ the 
greater the degree of religious observance, the more 
uncompromising are the positions taken in national issues. 
, role of PALESTINIANS ,in GULF WAR 
179. HARRISON (Drew), LEVITT (Wendy Kristianasen) and GIBBIKS 
(Penny). Biting the hand that fed. Middle East. 193; 1980, 
November; 19-20. 
Palestinians in occupied territories have demons-
trated remarkable popular support for Saddam Hussein's 
rape of Kuwait. This has caused counternation amongst its 
sympathisers and those left wing Israelis advocating a 
negotiated settlement. It also looks at the impact of the 
Gulf crisis on Palestinians. 
, RIGHT-WING NATIONALIST, LIKUD, ISRAEL 
180. GIBBINS (Penny) and HARRISON (Drew). Road to nowhere. 
Middle East. 188; 1990, June; 5-7. 
Formation of a right-wing nationalist government in 
Israel led by Likud appeared imminent after the collapse 
of the national unity coalition and the failure of labour 
to put together an administration of its own viewed 
realistically. This seems to spell the end of the road for 
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the peace initiative begun by the PLO in the wake of the 
outbreak of the Intifada. It also examines the evolution 
of the peace talks and the outlook from the perspectives 
of the PLO, Israel, the population of the occupied 
territories and the Arab states. 
, role of SOVIET UNION 
181. BRUNER (Whittey). Soviet new thinking and the Middle East: 
Gorbachav Arab-Israeli options. Comparative Strategy. 9, 
4; 1990; 385-401. 
When M. Garbachev assumed power in the USSR, he 
inherited a Middle East policy which had isolated the 
Soviet's from the Arab mainstream, tied to Syria and 
Libya. Moscow's policies in the region had been based on 
the zero sum concept of reduction of TVmerican influence 
and exploitation of the Arab-Israeli impasse. The Soviets 
are now more concerned with regional stability, 
proliferation of high technology weapons systems and 
Islamic fundamentalism. The Soviets now seek to confirm 
their superpower status through participation in the 
middle East peace process, thereby enhancing Gorbachev's 
peace maker image in the West. The Soviet also hope to 
maintain the current level of hard currency arms sales to 
the Arab world and to expand trade in region. Gorbachev 
may find it necessary to reorder Soviet priorities in the 
Middle East dramatically in order to avoid further loss of 
influence in the region. 
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, role of SUPER POWERS 
182. BEN-ZVI (Abraham). Superpower option for resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict : Precedents, preconditions, and 
prospects. Conflict. 10, 1; 1990; 63-81. 
Using the abortive superopower attempt of I October 
1977 to jointly define the parameters of an Arab-Israeli 
settlement as a conceptual and historical point of 
departure, the articles examines the possibility that the 
Bush administrated will seek to reactivate the so-called 
superpower option as a means of stabilizing, at long last 
a regional situation that is permeated with tension and 
animosity. It is suggested that most, albeit not all, 
domestic and external constraints, which in 1977 forced 
the carter presidency to abandon its superpower design, 
have since eroded or completely evaporated. 
183. RUBIN (Barry). Reshaping the Middle East. Foreign Affairs. 
69, 3; 1990, Summer; 131-46. 
The dramatic changes in the Soviet block and the 
international political balance make it necessary to 
rethink the nature of middle East politics and US policy 
towards a region which will remain locus of crises. For 
radicals, particularly Syria, Libya and the PLO, the 
changes signify the defection of their most important ally 
Pan-Arab nationalism has weakened as states take on their 
own characteristics and as regions. Explicity seek their 
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interests. The Soviet madel used by nationalist dictator-
ships, has been discredited the oil boom of the 1970s is 
largely a memory, econcxnic prospects are now generally 
poor. Following their failure Arab states have relegated 
the Arab-israeli conflict to low priority. 
, role of SYRIA,and EGYPT 
184. KIENLE (Eberhard). Arab unity schemes revisited : Interest 
identity and policy in Syria and Egypt. International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. 27, 1; 1995, February; 
53-71. 
Since the day in April 1946 when the last French 
soldiers left and Syrians were able to run their own 
affairs, their policies towards other Arabs have differed 
significantly, although decreasingly over the years, from 
the policies pursued by Egyptians. Syrian legislators used 
to privilege Arab over non-Arab foreigners in various 
respects, including the investment of capital and the 
acquisition of citizenship and political rights, while 
fewer such advantages were granted in Egypt. Differences 
in the treatment of noncitizen Arabs at home have been 
paralleled by different policies towards other Arab state. 
Unity schemes, a prominent feature in inter-Arab relations 
generally one key area where approaches diverseld and 
where favourable attitudes in Syrian often constrasted 
with constitutional unity may be linked to the concepts of 
collective ideality that were advocated by the dominant 
political groups in the two countries. 
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, role of TERRORISM 
185. GIBBINS (Penny). First shot in the war. Middle East. 
196; 1991/ February; 13-14. 
Was it coincidental mat Abu Lyad, the co-founder of 
Fateh with yasser Arafat, was murdered on the era of the 
outbreak of war in the Gulf ? First reports suggested that 
Abu Nidal's renegade organization was responsible for 
settling accounts. The PLO's identification of Israel as 
the culprit should be given considerable credibility. 
/ role of US 
186. BERGER (Elmer). Tangled web : Israel and the Gulf. Arab 
Studies Quarterly. 13, 1; 1991, Winter; 83-99. 
Mr. Bush is really serious about converting "his 
success" in the Gulf War into a viable formula for 
stabilization if not the realization of the over-worked 
generality of a just and enduring peace for middle East. 
Having said this, the recent war did accomplish a few 
classifications. (1) under present and even foreseeable 
conditions there is no possibility of using Israeli 
military strength to safeguard western interests in the 
abundant oil reserves of the Gulf Arab states, (2) the 
gulf states are more concerned with the closer danger from 
Iran and its still menacing potential for radical, Islamic 
fundamentalism that they are of Israeli aggression, 
(3)Medemographic Achilles heel in the Gulf states is the 
now, again stabilized population of several hundred 
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thousand Palestinians among the foreigners employed in 
Kuwait before the var, with smaller numbers in other Gulf 
Arab states. 
/ / BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
187. ROTHSTEIN (Robert L). Getting to may be i large steps to 
end a large stalemate in the Arab-Israel peace process. 
Jerusalem Quarterly. 52; 1990; 79-107. 
The Bush administration seems intent on playing the 
role of an unbiased mediator between Israel and the 
Palestinians, pushing both sides to make concessions on 
West Bank-Gaza elections and other matterls that will or 
might generate a genuine peace process. However the 
dangers of peace agreement have been apparent to the 
Israelis for various reasons. Many Israelis fear peace 
treaty as a potential source of increased security risks. 
They fear that it will be more costly and difficult to 
rectify a mistake if a new Palestinian state becomes a 
threat, and they doubt the reliability of vague promises 
of support once the world's attention shifts elsewhere. 
/ role of US ELECTION 
188. SHAMIR PUTS up a roadblock. Middle East. 201; 1991, 
July; 15-6. 
Time is quickly running out for the United states' 
latest attempt to resolve the Arab-Israel confrontation. 
In a few week's time, the United states will be too deeply 
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enmesh in presidential electioneering to have the energy 
or the political room for manoeuvre to make its influence 
felt. It looks as if the Israeli government's delaying 
tactics will probably succeed in dividing Arab ranks yet 
again. 
, role of US-SECURITY SYSTEM, GULF 
189. NOW WHAT'S the problem ? Middle East. 20; 1991, June; 
11-3. 
United States hauled in its allies (plus a few would 
be friends) to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. It also 
had the notion that a new system of security could be 
established in the Gulf as a result and perhaps a fresh 
start could be made on resolving the Arab-israeli crisis. 
It is depressing to note that, on the surface at least, 
not a lot has changed. 
, role of WATER RESOURCES 
190. DREZON (Tepler Marcia). Contested waters and the prospects 
for Arab-Israeli peace. Middle Eastern Studies. 30, 2; 
1994, April; 281-303. 
This article will focus primarily on the contested 
water resources between Israel and the Arabs and the 
rivalries among the riparians. However, it will also refer 
to their exclusively national water resources and to their 
individual water related problems, projected and 
conservation policies, for unilateral policies and 
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programs frequently influence the International 
competition. Where appropriate, too, it will refer to 
other respective constituent parties may share common 
problems and contribute to common solutions. 
, SECURITY, ISRAEL 
191. HOLLIS (Rosemary). Israel's search for security. Asian 
Affairs. 78, 3; 1991, October; 272-83. 
Ambiguities about the identity of Israel create 
fundamental dilemmas for Israelis when they approach 
issues of state security. The shared experiences of 
members of Jewish community during the 20th century both 
denotating and inspiring, have played a part in creating 
what is described as the "siege mentality" of Israelis and 
help explain the fears and the self-confidence with which 
Israelis approach questions of national defense. Divided 
in their views on how to deal with the Palestinian 
question and the occupied territories, Israeli politicians 
produced a peace initiative in 1989 which represented a 
compromise between the positions of the labor and Likud 
parties. Agreements across party lines dissolved, however, 
when it came to acting on the plan. There came the 
experience of this Gulf war of 1991 from which hardlines 
and dones drew irreconcilable conclusions. 
/ , SYRIA 
192. SNOW (Charles). Syria and Israel disagree on security. 
Middle East Economic Studies. 38, 29; 1995, April; Cl. 
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The American attempts to shift the emphasis on the 
Syrian track of the peace negotiations to security appears 
only to have revealed yet another issue on \fhich the 
Syrian and Israelis disagree diametrically in principle. 
The ideal American scenario for the peace negotiations 
between Israel and Syria ran something like this (1) The 
two countries reopen the talks between their ambassadors 
in Washington focusing an possible security arrangements 
rather than the gridlocked issues of withdrawal Israelis 
and normalization Syrian/ (2) State department coordinator 
Dennis Ross shuttles between Israel and Syria to help 
settle matters of principles, (3) senior military 
officers joins the talks to work out the application of 
principles on the ground, (4) The agreement on security 
arrangements clears the way for one side or the other to 
put forward its views on other issues, there are just 
demands that form an essential and social spring boad to 
establishing security arrangements between two countries 
in a state of war that want to move to a state of real 
peace". 
, SETTLEMENTS, OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 
193. SHAHAK (Israel). Religious settlers ; An instrument of 
Israeli domination. Middle East Policy. 3, 1; 1994; 44-55. 
Jewish settlers in the occupied territories from two 
separate groups : the secular settlers who differ little 
from average Israeli Jews, and the religious settlers who 
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have a distinctive Ideology and who follow distinctive 
patterns of behaviour. One of the manifestations of their 
zealotry is the attachment to their settlements. Owing to 
this factor, they have become a convenient tool of the 
Israeli governments policy to preserve Israeli rule in the 
territories. 
', SIX DAY WAR, 1967, role of US 
194. QUANDT (William B). Lyndon Johnson and the June 1967 War : 
What color was the light. Middle East Journal. 46, 2; 
1992, Spring; 198-228. 
The June 1967 Arab-Israeli war was one of those 
rare events that changed the land scape of the Middle East 
for years thereafter. Indeed, the "peace process" of 
recent years has bleen designed largely to deal with the 
aftermath of that conflict. This article provides evidence 
to support a 'yellow light' interpretation of US policy 
during the May-June 1967 crisis. To begin with, Johnson 
did not have any delsigns to bring down the Nasir regime 
before May 1967, although he found the Egyptian a 
difficult leader with whom to deal. During the first two 
week of the crisis, in the latter part of May, Johnson 
seems to have genuinely hoped to avoid a war in the Middle 
East. His reaction were measured, but clearly on the side 
of trying to restrain the Israelis from going to war. 
Towards the end of May, however, and in part because of 
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developments in the Arab world and in israel, Johnson 
abandoned the policy of making an all-out effort to 
prevent war. 
, SOVIET JEWISH IMMIGRATION/ effect on ELECTIONS/ 
1992 
195. REICH (Bernard) and WURMSER (Meyrav). Soviet Jewish 
immigration and the 1992 Israeli knesset Elections. Middle 
East Journal. 47, 3; 1993, Summer; 455-88. 
Immigrants have played a central role in the 
political and social life of the Israel and did so in 
Palestine before 1948. Since independence/ Israel's 
commitment to unlimited and virtually unrestricted Jewish 
immigration has been enshrined in the declaration of 
independence and the law of return; it has bleen 
reinforced by successive governments with overwhelming 
popular support. The commitment to Jewish immigration has 
been implemented almost without regard to economic costs 
and social dislocations or a political effects. In the 
pre-state period/ elach wave of immigrants was distinctive 
in its composition and imparted or particular imprint up 
on Israel. 
/ SOVIET JEWS 
196. MAKE WAY for the Soviet Jews. Middle East. 185; 1990/ 
March; 18-9. 
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Storm break out with in Israel's Likud party which 
could end all pretence of interest on the part of the 
prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, in meaningful peace 
negotiations. It was also, less dramatically, the occasion 
for a conference in Oxford examining the prospects for the 
third year of the intifada - and especially the probable 
impact of a massive influx of soviet Jews. It also examine 
recent developments against the background of the 
conference discussion. 
_, STUDENTS, ARAB-ISRAEL 
197. YOGEV (Abraham), BEN-YEHOSHUA (Nama Sabar) and ALPER 
(Yael). Determinants of readiness for contact with Jewish 
children among Arab students in Israel. Journal of 
conflict Resolution. 35, 3; 1991, September; 547-562. 
Organized encounters between Arab and Jewish 
students as a means of education for coexistence are 
questioned vis-a-vis the recent politicization of Arabs 
who are Israeli citizens, and the subsequent shift in 
their self identity from "Israeli Arabs" to Palestinians. 
A survey of 265 seventh grade Arab students in seven 
segregated and mixed Jewish-Arab communities reveals that 
their perceptions of Jews and of their own deprivation are 
determined by their political self identity rather than by 
earlier contact with Jews. Concluding that the contact 
hypothesis may not enhance interethnic relations in 
situations of political conflict, we suggest that the 
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school syston shift its focus from student's encounters to 
curricular programs dealing directly with the conflict 
issues. 
, SYRIA 
198. DIAB (M Zuhair). Have Syria and Israel opted for peace? 
Middle East Policy. 3, 2; 1994; 77-90. 
Since 1970-71 Syria's position regarding a peaceful 
settlement with Israel has gone through incremental 
alternations over time. Although the principles of 
accepting the reality of Israel within its pre-1967 
borders remained consistent/ the road to reach a 
settlement has undergone variations under the pressure of 
changing regional and international conditions. Syria 
believes that a comprehensive settlement is a precondition 
for peaceful coexistence with Israel. This should 
compromise a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied 
territories in 1967 and a solution to the Palestine 
problem. To achieve this objective/ Syria accepted the 
American peace initiative of 1991 thereby relying on 
American "good will" in order to accommodate the changes 
caused by the end of the cold war and the Gulf war against 
Iraq. However/ there cannot be a settlement unless Israels 
sheds iti^  concepts of territorial security. Otherwise 
power relationships being dynamic, there remains the 
possibility of war in the future. 
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, GOLAN HEIGHTS 
199. MULISH (Muhammad). Golan : Israel, Syria and strategic 
calculations. Middle East Journal. 47, 4; 1993, Autumn; 
611-32. 
The evidence presented in this article sets forth 
the hypotheses that the territorial dispute between Israel 
and Syria has its own dynamic, that it is a central focus 
of conflict between the two countries, and that its 
settlement promises a diplomatic breakthrough. Embracing 
the proposition that Syria's repossession of the Golan 
would, by itself lead to peace and normalization, however, 
should be tempered by an appreciation of the basic ethos 
of Syria and its perception of its regional role. Israels 
illegal policies and actions in the delimitarized zones 
before 1967 and in the Golan after 1967 posted strategic 
challanges that made an important contribution to keeping 
OE>en the door of conflict with Syria. Israel was 
determined to seize the DM2 in contravention of its 
armistic agreement with Syria. In Israel, the Golan 
question is not simply of a question of security. It is 
also a question of settlements, water, domestic politics, 
and to sene, it is ever a question of ideology. As to 
Syria, the Golan is an integral part of the Syrian 
homeland and it is also a question of security of Syria. 
Politically speaking, no Syrian leader is likely to accept 
loss than Egypt has accepted : total Israeli withdrawal in 
return for total peace and mutual and symbolic balanced' 
security arrangements. 
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, TERRORISM, HAMAS/ effect on ELECTIONS, ISRAEL 
200. ALBUM (Andrew). Prospects for peace. Middle East. 256; 
1996, May; 5-7. 
A series of horrific suicide bombing by Hamas 
terrorists may have handed victory in Israel's forthcoming 
elections to the right wing Likud opposition. Reviving 
memories of the not-so-distant past. Therefore an 
uncertain future for all. 
, TERRITORY EXPANSION, ISRAEL 
201. PIPES (Daniel). Imperial Israel : The Nile to Euphrates 
Calumny. Middle East Quarterly. 1, 1; 1994, March; 29-39. 
Many Arabs and Iranians claim that Israel seeks to 
expand its territory from the nile-river in Egypt to the 
Euphrates river in Iraq. Leaders who arrest this 
proposition include Gamal Abdel nasser, Yasir Arafat, 
Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, Rafanjani, Saddam Husayn, and Hafiz 
al-Asad. Is it true ? The idea comes primarily from two 
passages in the Bible painting to Jewish domination of the 
Middle East. But these passages do not make the greater 
Israel idela a reality. In fact, a close study shows that 
the fear of an imperial Israel is a fantasy, one that 
reveals more about Arafat and the others than it does 
about Israel. Nonetheless, notions of greater Israel have 
real significance in poisoning Arab-Israeli relations and 
thus prolonging an already century old conflict. 
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/ TOURISM ISRAEL, 1967-90 
202. MANSFELD (Yole). Middle East Conflict and tourism to 
Israel/ 1967-90. Middle Eastern Studies. 30, 3; 1994, 
July; 646-67. 
The aim of this article is to evaluate the impact of 
security situations on the propensity of tourists to visit 
the middle East over the last two decades. In this article 
two main question are addressed. The extent of the 
Arab-Israeli conflicts effect upon inbound tourist flows 
to this region and whether this effect is marked 
differentiated. Four hypothesis were established to 
examine these questions. The first dealt with the effect 
of siBcurity events related to the Arab-Israel conflict 
upon the overall tourist arrival to these countries. The 
second hypothesis claimed that the middle East conflict 
discourage tourists from visiting countries in the East 
mechterranean basin that are not parties in the conflict. 
The third hypothesis suggested that different middle east 
destination countries are variably affected by security 
situations in terms of inbound tourist flows. The fourth 
hypothesis suggested that the propensity of tourists to 
visit the middle east also market differentiated. This 
study managed to demonstrate that the middle East factor 
namely the regional perception of a 'nogo' area does not 
exist in practical telrms. 
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, URBANIZATION, ARABS, ISRAEL STATE 
203. SCHNELL (Izhak). Urgan restructuring in Israeli Arab 
settlements. Middle Eastern Studies. 30, 2; 1994, April; 
330-50. 
In this article an attempt is made to appraise the 
dynamics of urbanization in Arab sector in the state of 
Israel. It sets out to examine the role of demographic, 
economic and modernizing processes in three phases of 
urban restructuring, specifically in the Arab settlements 
that have been subject to Israeli rule since 1949. These 
settlements have benefited from the economic growth and 
the modernization which Israel has experienced for nearly 
40 years, during which the Israeli economy has expanded 
and taken on a monopolist. Capitalist configuration 
urbanization in Arab settlements has bleen complementary 
with the social and economic integration of the Arab 
sector in Israel. 
, VIOLENCE, ARAB and ISRAEL 
204. LEVITT (Wendy Kristianasen). Arabs unwelcome. Middle 
East. 196; 1991, February; 33-4. 
The upsurge of violence between Arabs and Jews in 
Israel and the occupied territories has resulted in a 
growing reluctance by Israeli employers to take on Arab 
labour. Israeli extremists are even demanding that the 
West Bank be related off. Israel will have difficulty 
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adjusting to a reduction in Arab labour/ but that economic 
effect on the Palestinians of the intifada are already far 
more severe. 
, WAR-1973 
205. ISRAELYAN (Victor). October 1973 war : Kissinger in 
Moscow. Middle East Journal. 49, 2; 1995, Spring; 248-68. 
This is an except from a memoir about the October 
1973 Arab-Israeli war. It focus on the negotiation between 
US secretary of state henry Kissinger and Soviet secretary 
General Leonid Brezhnev on ending the war. Written from 
the perspective of a senior Soviet ambassador, it analyzes 
the way the Soviet leadership perceived the war and its 
eventual settlement. The author, victor Israely was 
director of the soviet foreign ministry, department of 
international organization at the time. He was assigned to 
a four-man task force responsible for attending many of 
those meetings, taking notes, and preparing draft letters 
and documents for the politburo. 
, WATER PROBLEM 
206. COOLEY (John K). Middle East Water : Power for Peace. 
Middle East Policy. 1, 2; 1992; 1-5. 
Water, from 1947 to present, lies at the heart of 
the Israel-Palestine-Arab dilemma. Since the UN efforts to 
solve that dilemma began attempt after attempt to draw 
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viable armistic lines or writer peace agreements that 
would last have been blocked by the water question. 
Mideastern people find their most urgent problem to be 
securing adequate water supplies for drinking, irrigation 
and power generation. New and continuing industrialization 
in the Middle East strains water resources. Underground 
aquifers are drying up, and especially near seacoasts are 
becoming more saline and polluted. When these things 
happen concurrently, as is now the case, resulting and 
existing political tensions are dramatically aggravated. 
There are few solutions to this problem but to create a 
Middle East water Authority. The conservation, husbanding 
and allocation, if not the exploitation of Mideast Water 
resources, will have to transcend all the region's 
frontiers if water wars are to be avoided. 
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